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1. INTRODUCTION

The role of the state2 in managing, promoting, or participating
in economic development has come under intense scrutiny in the
last decade. In what have been described as "swings of the pendu* LL.B. University of Ghana School of Law, LL.M. Dalhousie Law
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to Professor Asif Qureshi for his searching questions that led me to focus on
this exciting subject. I also thank all the friends who have helped me with material for this and other related works. They include Raymond Atuuba, Fui
Tsikata, Eugene Cross, Siddhartha Mitter, staff at the Harvard Electricity Policy Group, and library staff at the French, Ivorian, and Malaysian Embassies.
The editorial work of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International
Economic Law staff is gratefully acknowledged. This Article is dedicated to
the faculty and students of the University of Puerto Rico Law School.
1 T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 19091950, at 138, 145 (1980), cited in Amy L. Chua, The PrivatizationNationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing
Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 223 (1995).
2 This work does not make a distinction between the state as a juridical
and theoretical construct and the practice of government as evidenced by the
control over the national purse, forces of national security, bureaucracy, international relations, etc. See JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI, 10-12 THE STATE AND
NUCLEAR POWER (1984); see also RALPH M.mAND, THE STATE IN
CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1969) (examining the various roles of the state in advanced capitalist societies).
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lum,"3 the state has been blamed for economic and, to some extent, political failures in many developing countries.' In developed countries, perception of the ubiquitous presence of the state
is cited for "relatively" slow economic growth.' The necessity for
a rollback of the state has, therefore, become substantially overwhelming.6 Indeed, the current economic reforms have been described as "unprecedented,"' "revolution[ary],"' and "momentous."9 This Article challenges that proposition.10 It presents
material from the global power industry that would urge a reexamination of that perspective. In outline, the Article gives a
historical overview and surveys current trends in electricity regulation. The key issues here are: (i) whether the current reforms
of the power industry are revolutionary or unprecedented, as
some writers have suggested; (ii) the extent to which government
participation has changed with the cycle of reforms; and (iii) the
consequences of the chronological, or cyclical, reforms on the
ideals or goals of government for the industry. The Article also
indicates the dichotomous results of government involvement in
the power industry in various countries and suggests that the

' Thomas W. Waelde, International Investment under the 1994 Energy
CharterTreaty, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5 (1995).
' This idea is encapsulated in works such as JONATHON H. FRIMPONGANsAH, THE VAMPIRE STATE IN AFRICA (1992) and DANIEL THORER ET AL.,
DER WEGFALL EFFEKTIVER STAATSGEWALT: THE FAILED STATE (1996). See
also TONY KILICK, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS IN ACTIoN (1978) (discussing
state participation in economic development).
s Anne Segall credits relatively low inflation rates and the "narrowing" of
the gap between the growth rate of the United Kingdom, as compared to
France, Germany, and the United States, to the Thatcherite reduction of state
involvement in economic activities. The Ladyfor TurningBritain: The Thatcher
Legacy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), May 8, 1999, at 33.
6 See FRIMPONG-ANSAH, supra note 4; MATHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW
MARSHALL, AFTER THE NATION STATE (1994); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END

OF THE NATION STATE (1995); THORER, supra note 4.
7 Rebecca C. Hanson, The Legal Frameworkfor Privatization in Hungary,
23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 441, 441 (1992).
' Jose Pinera & William Glade, Privatizationin Chile, in PRIVATIZATION
OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA 19 (William Glade ed., 1991).
9 John Surrey, Introduction to THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT:
PRIVATIZATION: THE RECORD, THE ISSUES, THE LESSONS 3, 5 (John Surrey
ed., 1996).
10 Although the current privatization movement might indeed be power-

ful in terms of its seemingly all-encompassing nature, both geographically and
chronologically, to describe it in such terms might be a bit too broad.
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critical variable for the success or failure of government participation is the presence or substantial absence of the tenets of good
governance."
2. CONTINUED STATE PARTICIPATION

An important preoccupation of this work is the identification
of the role of the state in the varying geo-political and chronological contexts, and how that role has contributed to the efficient, equitable, and stable operation of the industry. The question is, Has the role of the state in the electricity industry varied
with the swings of the economic and political pendulums, and if
so, with what consequences? 2
Notwithstanding a swing of the pendulum and the emergence
of models of "private" ownership and operation of energy utilities, 13 this work seeks to show that the participation of the state is
" The benchmarks of good governance in the context of this work include: effective bureaucracy, democratic competition for public office, rule of
law, judicious exercise of discretion, and the prevalence of freedom of speech,
press, and association. Most of the works on good governance refer to concepts like transparency, accountability, and public sector reform with frequently minimal analyses of their underlying ethos. As examples, see
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE I.M.F'S

ROLE (1997). Works that contain a deeper analysis of the issues include GOOD
GOVERNMENT

AND

LAW:

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

AND

LEGAL

(fulio

Faundez

INSTiTUTIONAL

ed.,

1997)

REFORM

and

IN

MAKING

DEVELOPMENT WORK (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1999).

12 For an impressive discussion of the swings in the pendulum, see Chua,
supra note 1, at 256-62.
13 See generally NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Assoc., ASIA DEv. BANK,

GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY REGIMES FOR PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT: FINAL REPORT (1997) [hereinafter ADB] (surveying the status

of various regulatory regimes for private sector infrastructure eve opment in
some of the Bank's dveloping member countries); EUGENE D. CROSS,
ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1996) (describing

and analyzing regulatory regimes from a national perspective through historical and recent developments ; ROBERT L. FROST, ALTERNATING CURRENTS:
NATIONALIZED POWER IN FRANCE 1946-1970 (1991) (discussing the nationali-

zation of electricity in France and how the private suppliers Have influenced
the technological and political environment of the state run power entity since
the 1950s); INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION

(Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn eds., 1996) (comparing energy regulation among different countries, with research demonstrating the possbility for
competition in large segments of the electric industry); INTERNATIONAL OIL
(Thomas W. W-lde & George
Ndi eds., 1994) (discussing the main issues underlying recent trends in international oil and gas investment policies and analyzing their long-term implication
for global industry); INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CONTRACTS: CURRENT
AND GAS INVESTMENT: MOVING EASTWARD?
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crucial for the attainment of the ultimate goals of the industry. It
is argued that the role and objectives of state participation have
largely remained constant in the face of the chronological, geographical, and technological metamorphoses of the industry."
From its inception in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
the industry has moved from being geothermal, oil-based, and
privately owned and operated to, soon after World War II, a regime consisting of monopolistic nationalized utilities." At the
turn of the millenium, there has been a growing shift towards gas
and, to a lesser extent, nuclear-based power, coupled with a global
move towards privatized ownership and management of the industry.'6 Notwithstanding the changes in ownership and operation paradigms and the attraction of newer technologies, the state
has remained a central player in the industry. There are two
broad sets of reasons explaining this position. First, the industry
commands enormous market influence not only because the service is a very essential one, but also because electricity cannot be
stored and, as a consequence, the consumer depends significantly
on the supplier."l Second, the industry depends overwhelmingly
on public assets such as rivers, land accessibility, and mineral or
petroleum resources; therefore, it has far-reaching impact on the
(Zhiguo Gao ed., 1994) (examining modern
petroleum contracts that have emerged over the years between government
and the private sector).
14 For a brief discussion of some of these changes, see Kenneth L. Lay,
Change and Innovation: The Evolving Energy Industry, 10 ENERGY & ENVT
415, 420 (1999).
15 See CROSS, supra note 13, at 1-2. A similar, but much earlier, discussion
of these trends, with particular reference to Sweden, is presented by MANS
LbNNRoTH ET AL., ENERGY IN TRANSITON: A REPORT ON ENERGY POLICY
TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

AND FUTURE OPTIONS 2142 (1980).

See LONNROTH, supra note 15, at 2142; see also Lay, supra note 14, at

415 (discussing how the shift to an information and communications economy
is impacting the oil and gas industry).
1
See Richard J. Gilbert et al., Introduction:International Comparisons of
Electricity Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY
REGULATION, supra note 13, at 1, 2-3. The nature of the power service makes
it a significant political tool. In the Canadian province of Quebec, it has been

shown that electricity tariffs have a direct relationship to election cycles. See
Jean-Thomas Bernard et al., Electricity Prices and Elections in Quebec, CAN. J.
ECON. 505, 506 (1997). It has been suggested that, for political reasons, increases in electricity prices should be gradual or incremental. See RALPH
TURvEY & DENNIS ANDERSON, ELECTRICITY ECONOMICS: ESSAYS AND CASE

STUDIES 20 (1977).
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environment."8 These reasons together make state participation
or oversight inevitable.
The role of the state is particularly conspicuous in the areas of
regulation, financial support, environmental protection, pursuit
of the ideals of equity, and the international imperatives of the
energy industry. The thrust of regulation is, in some cases, to facilitate the harmonization of varying technological systems used

by different players in the industry. 9 In other cases, it is to maintain national strategic interests and direction." The attainment of
the ideals of equity is also valorized by means of regulation. This

takes the form of price regulation by direct control or by the setting of a threshold price or price range.2 ' Through its ownership
"

See INTERNATIONAL

COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICrrY REGULATION, su-

pra note 17, at 1. Joseph Chamberlain is quoted as justifying state control and

restriction of competition in the power industry on the grounds that it interferes with private rights and public space. LESLIE HANNAH, ELECTRICrrY
BEFORE NATIONALISATION: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN BRTAIN TO 1948, at 23 (1979). Although

his emphasis is on the law of energy, Adrian Bradbrook indicates a number of
areas where the state, as repository of law, meets the business of energy. See
Adrian Bradbrook, Energy Law as an Academic Discipline, 14 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV T. L. 193, 194-205 (1996). These areas include routing and
construction of transmission lines and pipelines, corporate forms, financing,
and dispute resolution. Id. Bradbrook argues that the law intervenes to reconcile the interests of the industry, the state, and the individual consumer. Id at
200-01. Eyal Benvenisti considered private rights mechanisms and reliance on
the market for the allocation and use of water resources, but he retreated from
that position on the grounds of significant externality problems that inevitably
require state regulation, in addition to the problem of conflicting riparian interests and claims. Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilizationof Shared

Freshwater:The Challengesof lnternationalWater Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INTL
L. 384, 395-98 (1996).
19 See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont, The French Electricity Industry, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION, supra note

13, at 406, 408-09.
20 The French regard _lectricitide France ("EDF") as a beacon of socialist
or nationalist reconstruction. See FROST, supra note 13, at 1-2. In England, after privatization, the government retained golden shares that enabled it to prevent a takeover of the relevant utilities by American companies. See Mike
Parker, Competition: The Continuing Issues, in THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY
EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 215, 231.
21 For an exhaustive, if less current, analysis of various methods of assessing power tariffs, see TURVEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17 passim. The U.S.
government uses a profit-based rate of return method while the English system
is based on a price formula. See John Surrey, Unresolved Issues of Economic
Regulation, in THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 233,
245.
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of the utilities, the government often seeks to make power available to all parts of the country, including remote or economically
depressed areas.' Where private participation is permissible, it is
also encouraged to operate in order to reach disadvantaged com-

munities.'

Where the government owns the utility, financial

support for it is hardly contested.24 The receipts, expenditures,
and investments ultimately can be traced to the state treasury.
Although somewhat attenuated by privatization, state financial
support for private utilities often takes the form of very generous
terms of sale of the utilities, operation of the utility, or support
for the entity that is required to take the power generated by the
privatized utilities." Finally, the generation of power and opera' This is evident in most regimes around the world. See ADB, supra note
13, at 5; TURvEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 4.
' See ADB, supra note 13, at 5. Distribution of electricity to reach rural
and poor communities is justified, except that it must meet accounting costs.
See TURVEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 20.
24 When Pierre Simon was appointed the first director of EDF, he was reported to have said to the Director of the National Treasury: "I am the head of
the new power company, I guess you're my banker." FROST, supra note 13, at
84. Sometimes managers of state corporations are accused of having a "bottomless pit" of taxpayers' money to fall on. RJ.P. Ross, Government as Entrepreneur: With Special Reference to the UK, in PETROLEUM RESOURCES AND
DEVELOPMENT 202 (Kameel I.F. Khan ed., 1987). Other forms of state financial support may be by way of loan guarantees. It must be pointed out that
sometimes the state-owned utilities are weaned off state financial support, as
was EDF, which stopped relying on government support as of 1982. CROSS,
supra note 13, at 47. Instead, it became a net contributor to the French national income. See Eur. Parl., Written Questions with Answer, Written Question No. 1412/93, Answer given by Mr. Van Miert on behalf of the Commission, 1993 O.J. (C 327) 31. The Volta River Authority in Ghana also has
ceased to accept government subsidies although it is largely exempted from
paying tax on its income. See Francis N. Botchway, The State, Governance and
the Ene g Industry in Ghana, 33 LAW & POL. IN AFR. ASIA & LATIN AM. 176,

191-95 (2000).

s See Robert Pritchard & Douglas Webb, PrivatizationandPrivate Provision of Infrastructure, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AND THE LAW 67, 84-88 (Robert Pritchard ed., 1996). In England and Wales,

shares in the privatized utilities were under-priced to make them very attractive during elections; this was criticized as electoral bribery. See Steve Thomas,
The Privatization of the Electricity Supply Industry, in THE BRITISH
ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 40, 41. The government controlled price for the first three years of privatization; they also guaranteed and
yielded huge profits for the privatized utilities and their shareholders. See Surrey, UnresolvedIssues ofEconomic Regulation, supra note 21, at 246. The need
for a state-owned intermediary to help assure the profitability of the investment, as well as serve other "national" purposes, originated from, and is more
prominent in, the oil industry. See Kameel I.F. Khan, National Oil Companies:

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/2

2000]

GOOD GOVERNANCE & ELECTRICITIYMGMT

787

tion of power facilities implicates severe environmental consequences. Notwithstanding the advent of market instruments of
environmental protection, direct state control of the environmental impact of the energy industry remains unassailable."
3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

If state participation in the energy industry is inevitable, the
question is, How can this be made beneficial, or what principles
or mechanisms have to be in place for a successful state involvement in the industry? The importance of this question is underlined by the varying results of direct state ownership or participation in the industry. For example, whereas state ownership and
management of the utilities in the United Kingdom have been described as leading to satisfactory standards, the ownership and
management of the utilities by the state in Kenya have been disasIntriguingly, the two state-owned power utilities in
trous.'
Ghana have yielded polarized results." To what extent, then, is
government participation healthy, and, crucially, what is the variable that accounts for the differing consequences of state involvement in the energy industry? This Article proposes that
good governance is at the heart of the explanation for this dichotomy.
In all of these, and as already noted, the participation of the
state in the energy industry must be to attain three main objectives. These are efficiency, equity, and stability. Generally, Law
and Economics theorists classify efficiency under four broad categories: production efficiency, Pareto optimality, Pareto superiorForm, Structures, Accountability and Control, in PETROLEUM RESOUCES &
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 24, at 185, 185-90. For more on "take or pay" con-

ditions, see Henry Davey, "Take or Pay" and "Send or Pay":A Legal Review and

Long-Term Prognosis,11 OIL & GAS L. TAX REV. 419 passim (1997).
26 For a discussion of the market instruments of environmental control,

see ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ("OECD"), ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1989). A fusion of the

market and "state" models of environmental protection is illustrated by the
Environment Act, S.N.S., ch. 1 (1995) (Nova Scotia, Can.).
27 See Abeeku Brew-Hammond, Technological Accumulation and Electric
Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of the Volta River AuthorGeneration
Power
ity, Ghana
(1997) in
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex) (on
file with author).
28 See Botchway, The State, Governance and the Energy Industry in Ghana,
supra note 24 passim.
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ity and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.29 Production efficiency and, to a
large extent, the other efficiency concepts are substantively measured by price. A service or product is produced efficiently if it
can be made available to the greatest number of people at the

greatest price.3" It is believed that if the price is right, the product
would endear itself to many people. This implies a comparative
or competitive context. This is because, to determine the greatest

price, there must be similar products and producers to compare.
If government intervention in the economy takes the form of cre-

ating or protecting a monopoly producer, it would be difficult to
determine that the service or the product is made available at the
greatest price. In the absence of any such competition or comparison, Law and Economics assumes that the production is inef-

ficient; therefore, such governmental intervention is harmful to
consumers and, ultimately, to the economy.31

Admittedly, price may be the most scientific means of evaluating the desirability and, therefore, the efficiency of a production
process or decision. However, price as a means of assessing effi-

ciency is inadequate in important respects.32 For example, in the
29

Jules Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, in

(Avery Wiener
Katz ed., 1998). These concepts will not be dealt with in detail but a brief explanation follows. "Pareto optimality" refers to a situation where further resource reallocation would enhance the welfare of one person only at the expense of another. Id at 14. That is, reallocation wouldupset the equilibrium
distribution. Id. "Pareto superiority" is the case where no one is disadvantaged
by a redistribution that improves at least one person's welfare. Id. at 12-13.
"Kaldor-Hicks efficiency" is the concept that the people who benefit from a
redistribution can compensate those who were disadvantaged by a net gain in
welfare. Id. at 12.
31 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 passim
(1960) (discussing how markets, firms, and governments can and should handle
the problem of harmful effects). The "greatest number at the greatest price"
idea owes its origin to the axiom "greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
popularized by Jeremy Bentham. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 11-12

GOVERNMENT 1 (1823), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON

GOVERNMENT 393 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
31 See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, System of Belief in Modern American Law: A
View from Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 41 (1999) (stating that "because
*.. markets are self correcting, private economic power is not nearly so serious
a problem as is government interference in the market").
32 See Thomas Schelling, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 29, at 18.
Pricing is affected by limited or no information, technical feasibility, imperfect
institutions, need for simplicity and clarity, equity, and general political and
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generation of electricity from hydro sources, it may not be technically possible to have competition.33 In that case, comparison
of tariffs may be non-existent. On the other hand, it can be argued that if it were cheaper to obtain power from alternative
sources, then a decision to construct a hydro-electric plant is economically unwise.34 More importantly, governments may not
create or protect monopolies, but it is necessary to set rules for
the players for the purposes of fair competition, predictability,
and transparency. To set such rules is not an example of inefficiency."
Beyond the greatest number, greatest price criteria, it is suggested that making service available to the greatest number at a
great price may be another means of assessing efficiency. This is
because the drive to maximize profits may result in a concentration of production at a place that would yield immediate maximum returns on investment.3 6 This would not necessarily result
in the greatest number being served. Government intervention,
directly or indirectly, may, therefore, be necessary to expand coverage to a greater number, but that would not be at the greatest
price and could be at the cost of short term profits or taxes forgone. 7 To the extent that returns on investment remain positive
or attractive, the service could be provided to the greatestnumber
economic circumstances of the country. See id.Moreover, price based on cost

accounting does not take account of equity needs, such as poverty. See
TRVEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 6, 9. Sometimes economists are said
to emphasize price to the exclusion of value. See ROBERT DoRFMAN, THE
PRICE SYSTEM 1 (1964).
33It appears that the transmission of electricity has been accepted as the

only natural monopoly. See J.M. Mirjam Koster, Organizingfor Competition:
An EconomicAnalysis afElectricity Policy in the Netherlands, 26 ENERGY POL Y
661, 667 (1998).
"4Comparison based on sources of power and mathematical price calculations may be simplistic. See TURVEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 5.

"sThis may be accepted as resulting from market failure or market limita-

tion. See Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida, Energy Efficiency and the Limits of
Market Forces: The Example of the Electric Motor Market in France, 26 ENERGY
POL'Y 643 (1998). Ronald Coase notes the government's unique ability to get
some administrative regulation done at lower cost that leads udltimately to improvement in efficiency. See Coase, supra note 30, at 17-18.
36 This is what is referred to as "cherry-picking." Parker, supra note 20, at
227.
37 This is one area where efficiency and equity may conflict.
See A.
MITCHELL POLINSKEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 121
(2d ed. 1989); TURvEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 4.
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3
at a greatprice.
This would not be in strict accord with the Paretian mode of assessing efficiency." The reason is that there is reduced gain to the investor, but there might be net gain to the
community or society as a whole by way of long-term stimulation of the economy.4" This long-term stimulation is also obtained at the expense of short-term higher taxes to the government. If the projected stimulation manifests, it may assuage
possible criticism of Pareto inferiority. Law and Economics style
efficiency may not, therefore, hold absolute answers to the pursuit of efficiency in government-business cooperation in development.
Considering its methodology of quantitative analysis of legal
phenomena, Law and Economics also cannot provide certain
outcomes of governmental process.42 To that extent, and in the
light of the general governance framework of this work, a third
test of efficiency may be suggested. This is simply described as
process. One of the criticisms levelled against Law and Economics
measurement of efficiency- in particular, Pareto optimality and
its claim to freedom of choice, personal autonomy,43 and parity of
bargaining power- is that it does not take into account differences in access to information and competence to utilize the
available information in decision-making." In the absence of
3d Although this idea is analogous to the Benthamite axiom, the concept,
as used here, is more specific to utilities than the generalized Bentham formulation.
" See Coleman, supra note 29, at 13-14.

See TURVEY & ANDERSON, supranote 17, at 4.
See generally Avery Wiener Katz, Methodology of the EconomicApproach.
in FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 29, at 35 (focusing on economic methodology). It has been suggested that the methodology would not remain stagnant. See Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi, Law and Economics: An Introduction, in 1 LAW AND ECONOMICS ix, xii
(Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi eds., 1997).
42 The "efficiency-equity" debate is one illustration. For a relatively simplified presentation of the equitable or ethical ends of government policy, see
Schelling, supra note 32, at 18-23.
41 See POLINSKY, supra note 37, at 10; see also Duncan Kennedy, Distribu.
tive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, in FOUNDATIONS OF
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW, supra note 29, at 319, 321 (stating that
policies or decisions grounded in Law and Economics efficiency mode are
speculative).
44 See Coleman, supra note 29, at 16. Lack of information regarding technological options on Combined Cycle Gas Turbine, various details of hydro.
power, thermal power, etc., may affect unsophisticated private power entre40

41
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clear and complete information, individual bargainers cannot be
said to have struck their optimum bargain." This information
critique, it is submitted, is one section of the whole gamut of organizational, political, and economic arrangements.46 That arrangement stretches from government to business and the individual consumer.'
Government departments staffed by civil
servants of merit are likely to make quicker and more technically
proficient decisions in ways that should enhance net gain in complex sectors such as energy.4" That decision-making process can
be facilitated by the contribution of the broad populace.
Governmental arrangements and policy should also assist the
flow of information to the population.49 Therefore, for the optipreneurs in a less industrialized country. So also, technologies that may help
conserve energy, and therefore save costs for the consumer, may not be easily
available to the consumer. For information regarding lack of, or insufficient
information on, technologies, see Fagundes de Almeida, supra note 35, at 650.
For a discussion of the information asymmetry between resource-rich developing countries and transnational resource corporations and how to address it,
see David N. Smith, Information Sharing and Bargaining:InstitutionalProblems
and Implications, in INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE FLOWS 85 passim (Gerald
Garvey & Lou Ann Garvey eds., 1977).
41 See Coleman, supra note 29, at 14 (implying that knowledge, rationality,
and freedom of the market are critical conditions for optimum bargaining).
Estimates, or the failure of projections due to the lack thereof, or inadequate
knowledge, is what is referred to as bounded rationality. See generally Herbert
A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 q. J. OF ECON. 99, 99
(1955) (discussing the inaccuracy of assuming that the rational "economic man"
has a broad knowledge base).
46 See Coleman, supranote 29, at 14.
47 Sometimes the bargainers may be wrong in perceiving their real interest.
This is what Duncan Kennedy calls "false consciousness." Kennedy, supra note
43, at 322. One way of dealing with the information deficit in Japan is through
the Deliberation Councils, where overnment and business officials meet to
discuss business and developmental strategies. See JAMES E. SAWYER, WHY
REAGONOMICS AND KEYNESIAN EcONOMIcs FAILED 128 (1987).
48 This view may be criticized as paternalistic but most probably

is an enlightened one. See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 319-20. The hypothesis that
technocratic civil servants may make quicker and better assessments is clearly
contestable. See Thomas, Privatizationof the Electricity Supply, supra note 25, at
56 (querying the failure of civil servants to warn the British government at the
time of the impracticality of privatizing nuclear power). It must be pointed
out that, on this occasion, private financial and technical analysts were also
found wanting in their advice. See id.
" Diffusion of information is one of the most potent means of correcting
market failure. See Coleman, supra note 29, at 16 (suggesting that transactions
based on inadequate information are not completely free); Fagundes de Almeida, supra note 35, at 650-51.
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mum flow of information, there is the need for basic freedoms
such as speech, press, association, and conscience;"0 in the context
of modern trends, it is crucial that formal education of the people
be a priority."1
More importantly, the rules for economic processes must be
clear, predictable, and generally known. 2 It should be known,
for example, that the government prefers tender for energy projects to license or negotiated access. 3 Further, the contributions
and the procedures for the tender must be made available. All of
these must be located in an environment of durable, authoritative,
competent, and credible institutional arrangements. Law-making
bodies and procedure must be clearly defined. The same can be
said for adjudicatory institutions and law enforcement agencies.
Governmental and quasi-governmental institutions responsible
for specific subjects, such as competition, environment, communications, and fiscal and monetary policy, must also have clearly
defined goals and processes for managing the relevant subject.
Upon establishing clear definitions and proper procedures and
assuming the institutions are manned by well-qualified, motivated, and independent civil servants, the interaction between
government and business for economic development will be effiSee generally Benvenisti, supra note 18, at 405-09, 412-13 (expressing the
basic importance of human rights and other freedoms in dispute resolution so
that every side gets proper information).
51 See TURvEY & ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 14 (lamenting the lack of
information about consumer response to tariff adjustments and citing with ap.
proval the work of the consumer-oriented power forum in Britain, the Electricity Councils, in the collection of information about tariff experiments);
Fagundes de Almeida, supra note 35, at 651 (suggesting some means for dealing
with the information deficit, such as software tools and training programs).
52 In addition, provisions must be made for appropriate business secrets.
-1 European Community Directives on Electricity and Gas provide negotiated access and license as two of the means for new entrants or competitors to
get access to existing energy resources and infrastructure. See Council Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, arts. 4-5, 1996 O.J. (L 27) 23. For an analysis of
the two Directives, see Francis N. Botchway, ContemporaryEnergy Regime in
Europe, EUR. L. REV (forthcoming Dec. 2000). For a discussion of various legal
forms of getting access to petroleum resources, see Zhiguo Gao, International
Offshore Petroleum Contracts: Towards the Compatibility of Energy Need
and Sustainable Development (1993) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Dalhousie University) (on file with author). See also Ernest E. Smith, International
PetroleumDevelopmentAgreements, 8 NAT. RESOURcEs & ENVr 37, 38 (1993)
(mentioning the three basic methods to obtain a peteroleum development
agreement nationally).
50
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cient. Efficiency in this context can be measured, for example, by
the amount of time spent in processing inquiries, requests, and
applications by businesses and other relevant interests. For instance, the French oil company, Elf Aquitaine, withdrew from
Russia because it could not endure the long wait for approvals."4
In the 1980s, it took 298 days to process applications for small

businesses in Peru; in 1990, it took six to nine months in Hungary.5" One way of promoting process efficiency may be what
Epstein described as "simple rules for a complex world."56 That is
the formulation and application of simple generic rules that
mostly produce appropriate and expected results, instead of
finely-tuned but complicated rules or ad hoc bureaucratic discretion aiming unrealistically at optimum results in all cases.5 The
simple rules method may help ease the strains on a weak or rudimentary bureaucracy while promoting faster development.
Throughout this Article, therefore, three criteria will be employed to measure levels of relevant energy utility performance.
These are profitability, greatest number at greatest price,58 and
"process."59

4.

COMPARATIVE ANTECEDENTS

4.1. First Wave ofRegulatory Activity

In 1831, Faraday discovered a connection between magnetism
and electricity.6" Active and comprehensive exploitation of this
'4

Michael Barron, Managing Political Risk. New Issues Facing the Oil and

Gas Sector, 3 OIL & GAS L. TAX. REV. 77, 77 (1998).

Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Some Countries Poor?: The Role of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
55

DEVELOPMENT 39 (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997); Jacques Girod &
Jacques Percebois, Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa's Industries,26 ENERGY POL.
27 (1998) (commenting on delays in implementing agreed power reforms in
Africa).
56 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD passim
(1995).
5 Id.
58 See Coase, supra note 30 passim.
19 These measurements of efficiency are not only a departure from the
classical Law and Economics criteria, but also in contrast to technical criteria
See
based on load factors, reserve margins, availability factors, etc.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION, supra note
17, at 10-12.
60 See Aubrey Jones, Forewordto THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT,
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discovery began in the second half of the nineteenth century.6'
Since then, plans for a regulatory regime have occupied the minds
of legislators and other stakeholders. The first wave of regulatory
activity has generally been state-led, mainly by local government,
with provision made for private participation. 2
4.1.1.

England

In England, the Electric Lighting Act of 1882 provided for local authorities to lay electric cables for street lighting purposes or
to give their consent for private companies to do it.6 In order to
restrain possible monopoly profits and to make power accessible
to the community, the Act prescribed maximum rates for tariffs."
It also provided for nationalization
of private power enterprises
65
This prescription failed to produce
after twenty-one years.
grand nationalization at the turn of the century because power
technology progressed, pushing unit cost of production low and
engendering phenomenal competition. 66 By the end of World
War I, there were 600 undertakings in the industry.' Although
the less efficient outfits were subdued, the number of the active
players was still high. The difficulty was that the numerous utilities had varying voltages, thereby making interconnections nearly
impossible. Partly for this reason, the government intervened in
1926, establishing ownership of a "system of cables and power stations" that bought power from selected stations. 8
With the refusal of the existing utilities to relinquish and join
in a unitary consolidation project, the government established the
national grid with the Central Electricity Generating Board
supra note 9, at xv.
61 See id
62 See id. For example, in India, the Electricity Act of 1910 provided for
the issue of licenses to private power suppliers. See ADB, supra note 13, at 11.
For a compilation of statutes on electricity up to 1997, see 15 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1583 (Butterworths 1997) (containing
texts of Electricity Acts of 1947, 1957, and 1989; Energy Acts of 1976, 1983,
and 1989, as well as other electricity-related legislation and commentary).
63 Jones, supra note 60, at xv.
64 Id.
65

Id.
Id.

67
61

Id
Id. at xv-xvi.
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("CEGB") as the owner of the grid.

795

9

The Board also had the
mandate to plan new stations.' The state intervention was effective in dealing with the coordination and transmission of power
between the regions. 7' This relative ease in inter-regional power
flow enhanced accessibility to remote areas.72 The easy power
flow did not, however, deal with the problem of diversity of
power supply within regions. Voluntary effort in this direction
also failed.73 This diversity and instability was the foundation for
the nationalization of the utilities in 1948. 74
The CEGB was the primary agency responsible for power
generation and transmission. 5 In addition, twelve locally monopolistic Area Boards existed to purchase bulk power from the
CEGB for distribution to their customers. 76 To a certain extent,
the Area Boards represented a decentralized electricity distribution system that was reinforced by the creation of the Electricity
Council." This was basically a policy discussion forum that included representatives from the CEGB and the Area Boards.7 8 It
was an avenue for the venting of concerns from consumers and
other interest holders. The forum reflected not only the need for
freedom of expression, but also participatory democracy, which
enhanced mutual understanding of industry operations by consumers and gave voice to customers' concerns about service.
4.1.2.

Ghana

In Ghana, the first legislation on electricity was the Electricity
Supply Ordinance of 1920. 7' As in the case of England, the Ghanaian legislation provided for private participation in the genera69

Id. at xv.

70

Id. at xvi.

71
72

Id
Id

73 Id.

74Id
s See Parker, supra note 20, at 215-22.
76

See id.

77 JOHN BOWDERY, QUAITY OF SERVICE IN REGULATED INDUSTRES 48

(1994).
78

Id.

9 Electricity Supply Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST
COLONY c. 48 (1928); Electricity Supply (Control) Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF
THE GOLD COAST COLONY c. 49 (1929).
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tion and distribution of power."0 It also empowered the Governor to appoint inspectors to supervise the construction, maintenance, and working of all power plants in the country."1 In practice, however, the Electricity Department provided power
services under the auspices of the Minister for Public Works. 2
This practice may be attributable to the small population of the
country at the time, as well as the fact that there was very little
industrial activity. 3 Therefore, the necessary demand stimulus
that would otherwise engender private investor interest was absent. In addition, there was a dearth of technical and entrepreneurial expertise at that time. 4 Further, it was unlikely for a local
entrepreneur to marshal the necessary capital outlay needed to
make the project profitable." Thus, unlike England where competition and technical diversity triggered state regulation and nationalization, capital and technocratic mobilization frailties and
limitations in the market for power invariably ushered in the
state as power provider. Additionally, both countries, but in
Ghana only the state, had human bureaucratic capacity to supervise or regulate the industry at that rudimentary level.

o Electricity Supply Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST
COLONY c. 48, §§ 4-8 (1928). See also the preamble to the two Ordinances; the
Electricity Supply Ordinance, for example, was "to make provision for the
supply by private enterprise of electricity for lighting and other purposes."
Electricity Supply Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST COLONY c.
48 (1928); Electricity Supply (Control) Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF THE GOLD
COAST COLONY c. 49 (1929).
8" Electricity Supply Ordinance, 1 THE LAWS OF THE GOLD COAST
COLONY c. 48 % 16-18 1928).
82 Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 141.
The population of Ghana in 1960 was around six million. M.M. HUQ,
THE ECONOMY OF GHANA 40 (1989). In 1998, it was estimated at eighteen
million. THE COMMERCIAL SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GHANA AT A
GLANCE, at http://www.usembassy.org.gh/cs_ghgla.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2000). For general features of the Ghanaian economy, see LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, GHANA: A COUNTRY STUDY, at http://Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/
cs/ghtoc.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2000); GHANAWEB, ECONOMY AND
FINANCE, at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/ghana/ghecon
.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2000).
84 An argument on similar lines was made in relation to Kenya. See P.M.
Nyoike & B.A. Okech, Energy Management in Manufacturing industry: The
Case of Kenya, in ENERGY MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA 87 (M.R. Bhagavan & S.
Karekezi eds., 1992).
8 See HUQ, supra note 83, at 50.
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Mexico

The nature of regulatory practice in Mexico before 1960 resembled, to some extent, the practice in England. Prior to World
War I, the electricity, oil, railway, and other industries were in
private hands, mainly those of foreign investors.86 Although the
Cardenas government of the 1930s pursued a nationalization path
(nationalizing the oil industry among others), electricity generaIt is not
tion remained in the hands of foreign entrepreneurs.
easy to fathom the reason for the continued private ownership of
the electricity industry during the massive waves of state ownership. One possible explanation is that the nationalization policy
faltered badly as general national economic production and the
standard of living declined; therefore, the popularity of the policy
and the government suffered." This may account for the radical
reversal to privatization by the Manuel Camacho government
throughout the 1940s and until 1958.89
4.1.4.

Russia

In Russia, the power industry also started as a private business
dominated by foreign, mainly German, interests. 90 World War I
provided the platform for a gradual nationalization of the industry, starting with the expropriation of the utilities owned by
businesses from enemy countries, and finally ending with the
Leninist nationalization and industrialisation drive. 91

" Chua, supra note 1, at 229.
17 The Federal Electricity Commission ("FEC") was in charge of distribution; industries that consumed substantial amounts of power, such as steel and
hard rock mining, had their own generation systems and could sell excess capacity to the FEC. See WILLIAM E. COLE, STEEL AND EcONOMIc GROWTH
IN MExICO 120-22 (1967).

See Chua, supra note 1, at 232.
See id. For an outline of successive Mexican governments' attitudes toward foreign investment see Sandra F. Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelinesfor Foreign
Investment The Selective Promotion of Necessary Industries, 80 AM. J. INT' L.
281 (1986).
88
89

" Municipalities also had significant utility interests. See generally Jonathan Coppersmith, TI ELECTRIFICATION OF RUSSIA, 1880-1926, at 255-56
(1992) (describing the Soviet government's desire to establish small rural utility
stations in order to gain the support of rural Russia).
91 Id. at

104-06, 127.
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South Africa

In South Africa, private power companies emerged in response to the surging demands for power by the mining industry.92 Victoria Falls Power Company overshadowed the rest by
its size and market power.93 In 1948, the state nationalized the
utilities and amalgamated them under the ESCOM. 94
4.1.6.

South Korea

The South African experience was similar to that of South
Korea. In South Korea, the power business was started in 1889
and primarily owned and managed by private business. 9 Almost
a century later, in 1982, the different companies merged and became nationalized as Korea Electric and Power Company
("KEPCO"), which eventually took over as the sole power utility
in Korea.96
4.1.7

Kenya

As in the case of South Korea, private interests initiated the
electricity industry in Kenya as far back as 1906.9' It was not until 1955 that the then-colonial government became directly involved as a shareholder. 8 In 1964, the government acquired a
fifty percent share in the Tana River Development project. 9
About ten years later, it bought up all the equity shares and established the Kenyan Power and Lighting Company Ltd. ("KPLC")
as the sole state-owned utility in the country.
4.1.7.

Conclusions

From these examples, a cycle of private enterprise followed by
state ownership emerges. Similar practices of private interest al' Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 399.
9' Id. (discussing the takeover of Victoria Falls by the Electricity Supply
Commission ("Escom"), one of the world's largest electric power utilities).
94 Id.

91 Id. at 403.
96 Id.

97

Id. at 267.

98

Id.
Id. at 267-68.

9

101 Id. at 268.
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lowance in the electricity industry can be found in other countries at the same time. 101 It is, therefore, inaccurate to say that
"since its beginnings over 100 years ago, the [Electricity Supply
Industry] in all countries has been.., linked by common state
ownership, governed by an obligation to supply all consumers in
their franchise area."102
4.2. Second Wave ofRegulatoryActivity
The second phase of the historical evolution of electricity
regulation, mainly in the post-World War HI period, was represented by widespread state ownership and management of power
utilities."3 Some of the reasons for this trend included the dearth
of capital after the war,"4 the need for rapid post-war reconstruc-

tion, the need for integrated and centralized power systems to
promote economies of scale and efficiency," the outburst of left-

leaning ideology," 6 and the advent of nuclear power."

State-

101 See

Lennart Hjalmarsson, From Club Regulation to Market Competition,
in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICrIY REGULATION, supra note
13, at 126, 127 (suggesting that the same privatization-nationalization cycle operated in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries); jiirgen Miiller & Konrad

Stahl, Regulation of the Marketfor Electricity in the FederaFRepublicof Germany,
in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION, supra note
13, at 277, 279-82 (describing the same cycle in Germany); Leonard Waverman

& Adonis Yatchew, The Regulation of Power in Canada, in INTERNATIONAL

supra note 13, at 366, 374-75
(describing a similar cycle in Canada).
102 Surrey, Introduction,supra note 9, at 4.
13 See Barry Metzger, Forewardto ADB, supra note 13 passim (discussing
the opening of infrastructure sectors in the Asian and Pacific Region to private
and foreign investment). Countries like Bangladesh, however, represent an exception to the three cycles of privatization, nationalization, and privatization.
From its independence in 1971, three state-owned, vertically integrated utilities, operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy and were responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution. Id. at 4. Under the 1996
Private Sector Power Generation Policy of Bangladesh, private participation in
the energy industry iswelcome. Id. at 5.
104 Laffont, supra note 19, at 412 (citing lack of capital as the primary reason for French nationalization).
COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION,

105 .d

106New Zealand may be considered an exception to the general position

that the electricity business was initially the domain of private business, but the
state involvement was predicated on socialist or left-leaning ideology. See J.G.

Culy et al., The Evolution of New Zealand's Electricity Supply Structure, in
supra note 13,
at 312, 315.
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION,
107 See Waverman & Yatchew, supranote 101, at 402-03.
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owned corporations were constituted by legislation and given
mandate to generate, transmit, and distribute power. In other
words, vertically integrated monopolies were the norm from the
post-war era to the closing days of the Cold War. Available records indicate that inquiry into the performance of the stateowned utilities would be inconclusive. In the United Kingdom,
the absence of private firms actively researching and developing
new power technologies provided an impetus for the CEGB to
This ability enhanced
design and construct its own plants.'
technological accumulation and capacity. This independence was
reinforced by the conscious policy to rely on British-mined coal
for generating power, which had macroeconomic implications for
the country. The nationalization of the industry in Britain occurred during the period of post-World War II reconstruction and
remedied the problem of power access to remote regions."' The
nationalized industry was successful in expanding capacity and access and maintaining a high standard in power supply. Its productivity and efficiency was considered creditable, if not outstanding, in global terms."'
In Kenya, the state-owned KPLC was said to have started off
well, largely satisfying customer needs and operating with a
healthy financial balance."' At the time of independence in 1963,
KPLC's total capacity for electricity was 79MW. 1 Twenty-five
years later it was 705MW." 3 Power outages were unknown and
there was strict adherence to maintenance rules and procedures. 14

Rural Electrification Programs were pursued, with the power utility contributing two percent of its gross sales revenue to such

programs."' In the 1980s, however, decline and inefficiency set
in. Bureaucratic procedures introduced in the 1980s for the acquisition of spare parts and related essential equipment generated

108 Steve Thomas, Strategic Government and Corporate Issues, in THE
BRITISH ELECTRICrrY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 255, 275.
'09 See Jones, supra note 60, at xvi.
110 See John Chesshire, UK Electricity Supply Under Public Ownership, in
THE BRITISH ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 37-38.
111 Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 275.
112 Nyoike & Okech, supra note 84, at 95.
113

114
115

Id.
Id. at 96.
Id.
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long delays, sometimes up to three years." 6 In addition, maintenance schedules are constantly modified to suit political and bureaucratic whims."' A 301VW gas turbine plant has been out of
service for two years."' The Turkwell Gorge power project was
riddled with corruption of international proportions." 9 In spite
of imports from neighboring Uganda, 120 the KPLC has not been
able to meet the growing demand for power, and power outages
phenomenon with severe consequences
have become an accepted
2
for the industry.' '
It is not difficult to locate the reasons for this unsatisfactory
state of the power industry in Kenya. They include: political interference exacerbated by the absence of ideals of good governance (particularly suppression of political opposition), abuse of
discretion, and lack of independent and technocratic regulatory
institutions. The causes are manifested in the arbitrary determination of tariffs to suit political exigencies-determinations which
are not based on economic and technical principles."z With the
116

Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 275.

Id A case in point is the story of equipment imported for repairs on
the Kiambere hydroelectric station that was wasted because the plant could not
be shut down for political reasons while the imported equipment exceeded its
shelf life of six months. Id. at 276-76. This happened twice. Id.
117

11
119

ik at 270.
ik at 273-74 n.6.

The imports from Uganda are under a fifty-year agreement, due to expire in 2010. lyoike & Okech, supra note 84, at 95-96. Under the agreement,
Uganda is to supply 30MW of power regularly and an extra 15MW in case of
extra load requirements. Id Due to bad governance and instability in Uganda
in the 1970s and 1980s, supply from Uganda has been less than the contractual
requirement, sometimes as low as 10MW. Id
12 Kenyan Firms Fear Losses as Power Rationing Begins, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, July 20, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. In
1998, Ghana lost more than $280 million in national income due to power rationing. Electricity Returns to Industries in Ghana, XiNHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Aug. 5, 1998, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File. Nigeria, an oil
producing country, also faced an energy crisis attributable to bad governance.
See Paul Ejime, Calm Returns to Lagos, Along with Transport Problems, APR.
NEWS, July 13, 1998, at 1.
12 See generally Nyoike & Okech, supra note 84 passim (discussing Kenya's
economic trends while focusing on the energy industry). Economic problems
and drought have also been cited as responsible for the malaise in the energy
industries in respective African countries. See id. at 114-17; Brew-Hammond,
supra note 27, at 275. While this is so, it is also true that the economic problems have been brought about or facilitated, if not exacerbated by, bad governance. This was particularly so in the 1970s and 1980s, when there were many
little-educated military and quasi-military juntas headed by power obsessed
120
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exception of South Africa, the story of the KPLC may not be
atypical of power utilities in Africa.' With this unflattering picture in Africa and with a swing in ideological and economic
thinking in the West, it is no surprise that the thrust of the power
discourse has shifted back to privatization. Notwithstanding the
seemingly universal movement towards privatization, the nature
of the process, it is submitted, is not monolithic. Apart from
that, the state is conspicuous in its varying roles in all the models
of reform.
5.

CURRENT TRENDS

Various countries have adopted models of reform reflecting
the circumstances of the particular country. These variations re-

late especially to sources of the electricity, strength of the civil
and bureaucratic machinery, the country's attractiveness to investors, the political orientation of the dominant political forces in
the country, and regional economic and political dynamics."
A
scan of the reforms in countries across the globe reveals four significant models around which countries cluster in their respective
restructuring efforts.12 These are: (1) continued state-owned
autocrats, such as Sergeant Idi Amin (Uganda), Sergeant Samuel Doe (Liberia),

General Mobutu (Former Zaire), Captain Rawlings (Ghana), Colonel Mengistu
(Ethiopia), General Eyadema (Togo), and Mr. Arap Moi (Kenya).
12 A number of reasons have been advanced for the poor performance of
power utilities in Africa. These include lack of spareparts, diversity in equipment, political interference, and absence of managerial independence. See Girod & Percebois, supra note 55, at 23-24. Not too dissimilar trends existed
elsewhere. In India, for example, the publicly owned power industry was also
fraught with unsatisfactory technical performance, frequent outages, and severe
liquidity problems, caused in part by political pressures from state governments for very low tariffs for certain groups of consumers. See ADB, supra
note 13, at 12. This was the immediate springboard for the lead taken by the
state of Orissa to radically reform its regulatory system allowing for private
participation and the establishment of an independent regulatory body. See id.
at 12. Similarly, the Philippines experienced a paralyzing power crisis in the
early 1990s manifested in frequent interruptions of supply. This led to the enactment of legislation under a certificate of emergency to de-monopolize and
unbundle the hitherto vertically integrated state-owned utility- the National
Power Corporation. See id at 110.
124 See INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF ELECTRICITY REGULATION,
supra note 13, at 2-6.
125

For an indication of these trends, see ADB, supra note 13, at 4; EAST

ASIA ELECTRICITY REFORM- FINAL REPORT (Kate Lingley ed., 1996).

See

generally CROSS, supra note 13 passim (describing reform structures in the
European Community); INTERNATIONAL COMPAISONS OF ELECTRICITY
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monopoly; (2) state-owned monopoly with private participation
and competition; (3) private-owned monopoly; and (4) private
ownership with competition. The rest of the Article presents
these models with a country serving as an example in each case.
The searchlight remains focused on the role of the state.
5.1. State-Owned Monopoly (France)
The power regime in France is often considered one of the
most outstanding examples of a state-owned power monopoly. It
has been described as "the world's largest electricity companywhich has grown fat in its protected home market."126 France is
currently under some pressure, mainly from the European
Community, to reform its power system, at the least, by unbundling the accounts and possibly the operations of the various segments of the power industry." Even if the country yields to that
pressure and privatizes, partially or otherwise, it is this paper's
contention that it would not be novel or unprecedented. The
electricity industry in France, as was the case in many countries,
did not start life as a vertically integrated state monopoly."' It
started as a geographically fragmented, privately owned and managed industry." In the 1890s, private entrepreneurs flocked into
hydro-based power generation, targeting primarily the paper and
metallurgy industries. 3 In order to shorten the period for investment recovery, the private power producers focused on industrial consumers with little attention paid to domestic and
commercial consumers. 3 1 This disparity lessened somewhat after
World War I when domestic and commercial demand soared,
precipitating expansion in investments in the 1920s.1 2 The desire
to reap early and high returns on the investment again conditioned the choice of premium consumers. This time preference
was given not only to industrial consumers but also to domestic
REGULATION, supra note 13 passim (discussing reforms formulated in terms of

three ownership structures).
126 Simon Holberton & David Buchan, Energy for a Fight, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Mar. 18, 1997, at 19.
17 See The Electricity Directive 96/92, art. 13-22 1996 Oj (L 27) 20, 25.
1
See Laffont, supra note 19, at 406-08.
'2

See id.; CROSS, supra note 13, at 27-28.

130 FROST, supra note 13, at 10.
131

IU

132
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consumers in densely populated areas, such as Paris, Lyons, and
Marseilles."' Sparsely populated areas were largely ignored. 34
This obviously attracted government interest.
Another factor that attracted government interest and intervention was the diversity in equipment, transmission, and voltages of the power supplied by the various regionally-based private
utilities.13 The managers showed little interest in grid building to
connect production sites with consumption points.136 The limited
interconnections resulted in high operations costs and limited
choice for consumers. 3 Paradoxically, the managers called for
administrative or corporate integration and consolidation of the
industry, but they faced structural, economic, and political obstacles. 3 The foregoing notwithstanding, and apart from the formation of holding trusts to oversee and manage clusters of utilities, 139 there were considerable, if less formal, connections
between the utility managers, banks, and equipment suppliers. 4
The monopolistic characteristics of the industry, therefore, extended to many relevant support agencies, coalescing them, in the
eyes of the public, into a bourgeois club of exploiters. 41 Another
source of dissatisfaction, and one that largely served as the immediate platform for government intervention in an otherwise private power industry, was the maintenance of high tariffs and corresponding high profits.'
This caused substantial resentment,
especially when the high rates were kept through the depression
in the 1930s. 43
In response to the neglect of mainly rural and domestic consumers, the abuses of the trust regime, the monopolistic character
of the private power industry, and the discontent generated by
high tariffs and their political implications, the French government intervened in a number of ways. In 1906, the government
133

Id. at 11.

Id.
135 Id at 12.
134

136 Id at 10.
137

Id.

13

Id. at 13.
Id at 16.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 16-20.

138

142 Id at 14-20.
143 Id
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established a regime of concessions to be administered by local
communities, especially in areas where land was required for
power purposes or where residents were to be served by an interThis provided the affected communities with reested utility.'
source rent and discounted power rates.14 In the 1920s, Parliament enacted legislation that encouraged local and municipal
councils to enter the electricity industry. 46 The year 1935 saw
the first direct central government intervention in tariff determination when, as a result of political considerations, the government ordered a reduction in tariffs. 4 The government also created the Conseil Supe'rieur de lILlectricitj to arbitrate conflicts,
including rate disputes, between local communities and utilities. 48
Therefore, government involvement in the power industry was
used as a means of conferring significant- regulatory influence on
That also created a local political
local and municipal councils.

patronage system in addition to a patchwork of power systems
and regulations in France. Thus, the dire need for a substantial
power base for the purposes of rebuilding and modernizing postwar France, the dearth of capital resources for investment in the

industry, and the political landscape and fervor in France at the
time culminated in the passage of legislation in April 1946 to nationalize the electricity industry and to create a vertically inte-

grated monopoly, EDF.150

Id. at 12.
Id. This became part of patronage in the local communities. Id.
Id. at 13. Apart from utilities owned by local or municipal councils,
agricultural, and other co-operatives, organized under utilities owned by local
governments, such as Socie'ts d'Interet CollectifAgricole d'Electricite and Regies,
emerged in many areas, but had an insufficient financial base. Id.
147 Id at 15.
14 Id. The composition of the Conseil weighed in favor of the utilities, so
the utility managers could block reforms by the Minister for Public Works,
who had supervisory responsibility for the power industry.
149 The government also had its own utility development programs. For
example, in 1921, the state established the Compagnie Nationale du Rhone to
help the Rhone Valley with irrigation and electric power production. It also
pr9vided half of the capitalization for a holding company, Groupement
d'Electricit, but these initiatives were frustrated by the outbreak of the Second
World War. Id. at 15.
"' Nationalization can be attributed to the need to lay a strong power base
for industrial take-off after the demolition of the country by the Germans and
their allies. See FROST, supra note 13, at 37. State involvement was seen as the
only way out of the severe liquidity difficulties that constrained investment
and expansion. Id. at 37. Nationalization was also part of the effort to end the
144

145
146
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Governmental supervision of EDF is shared by three Ministries. The Ministry of Finance oversees the levels of tariff, capital investments, and the general economic implications of EDF's

activities.5 2 The Ministry of Industry, Post and Telecommunications and Foreign Trade is responsible for general efficiency and
deals with general energy policy.5 3 The Ministry of the Environment is in charge of the environmental aspects of EDF's ac-

tivities, especially relating to emissions."5 4 Considerable administrative discretion is vested in the relevant regulatory departments.

For example, judicial authorities are generally bereft of jurisdiction or reluctant to question the legality or liability of the regulatory authorities.'
Although EDF is owned by the government
and considered as part of the state, it is, in reality, autonomous in
many significant respects.'56 Article 4 of the legislation that nationalized the utility provided for financial, technical, and commercial independence of EDF"' It pays tax, as does any other
commercial venture, and is in control of its technical development, as well as commercial venturing.158
To date, EDF largely remains the sole power utility in France.
There is, therefore, little basis for comparative assessments of the
efficiency of the EDF or the French system. It does appear to be
doing well on a number of fronts. From its inception, EDF has
sought and strenuously guards against governmental or political
interference in ways that could compromise efficiency. It has
maintained what has been described as a "technocracy," placing

sharp class divisions that hampered both political and economic development,
especially since the private utility managers were seen as manipulating the
course of pre-war French politics to their advantage. Id. at 1-2. It can also be
said nationalization was very much the vogue soon after the war. Power was
nationalized in the United Kingdom at about the same time. Jones, supra note
60, at xvi.
"' See CROSS, supra note 13, at 32-34.
152 See id.
153 See id
154 See id.
155 See id. at 33. Any form of judicial intervention is by the administrative
courts under the auspices of the Conseild'Etat. Id.
156 The governmental attitude is based on a philosophy that extols the virtues of limited controls on the public sector. See id. at 34.
1.. Law No. 46-628 of Apr. 8, 1946, J.O., Apr. 18, 1946, p. 9.
See also
CROSS, supra note 13, at 31.
151 See Holberton & Buchanan, supra note 126, at 18.
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emphasis on the technical merits of the enterprise."5 9 For that, it
touts its profitability as one of the results of the technocratic orientation of the business. Its gross profit for 1997 amounted to
FRF seven billion.16 Equity capital increased threefold to FRF
82.4 billion. 6 ' The quality of supply was further enhanced. Average annual outage time for low voltage customers dropped from
one hour and twenty-one minutes in 1996 to one hour and four
minutes in 1997.162 EDF marked 1998 as the year of customer
commitment, providing enhanced customer service at local and
community levels, price reductions, and "made-to-measure" solutions to meet the requirements of major customers.'63 It must be
pointed out that the picture of EDF is not always as rosy. Its current Chairman, Edmond Alphandery, a former Finance Minister,
described the relationship between EDF and the French government prior to 1996 as neither clear nor very healthy."'4 For example, EDF is forced by the government to subsidize hydroelectric power, support French overseas territories and help the

country's declining coal industry. 6 ' In the environmental field,
EDF presents interesting issues. In the first place, due to its
overwhelming reliance on nuclear energy and the high risk that
that poses, it has to be held to the highest safety standards. Since

only 5.5% of the power produced by EDF comes from fossil fu-

els, neither carbon dioxide nor sulphur dioxide is produced in
great amounts and the contribution to atmospheric pollution and
the greenhouse effect is minimal. 66
s9 FROST, supra note 13, at 20-24 (noting that a technocracy encouraged
technological development, capital investment, and economic growth); Holberton & Buchanan, supra note 126, at 29 (stating that EDF has created a large
organization of experts with technological and managerial backgrounds in order to develop its business dealings internationally).
ELECTRICIT DE
160 It paid a tax of FRF 3 billion to the government.
FRANCE, EDF ANNOUNCED FINANCIAL RESULTS
http://www.edf.fr/html /en/actualites/index.html.
161
162

(Mar. 4,

1998),

at

See id.
This is a twenty percent reduction from the previous fiscal year. See id.

163 ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE, ARCHIvES: PRESS RELEASES,

at http://

www.edf.fr/html/en/actualites/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000) (compiling various press releases from 1998 that describe EDF's efforts to improve customer service).
164 Holberton & Buchan, supra note 126, at 18.
165 See id.
166 See EDF, EDF AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN EXEMPLARY ATTITUDE:
FossiL-FRED POWER: EFFICIENCY AND POLLUTION CONTROL, at http://
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There are plans to "unbundle" the accounts of EDF in line
with the EC Electricity Directive of 1996.167 It is likely, however,
to remain state-owned. 168 It would, in accordance with the EC
Directive, face competition from utilities from member countries
of the EC. 9 When that happens, under Article 47 of the proposed reform bill, the power regime in France may take the shape
of a state-owned utility operating in the midst of competition
from private utility interests, mainly non-French. To some extent, the Malaysian system can be said to offer a precursor to
what is likely to be the new regime in France. It is that to which
we turn next.
5.2. State Ownership with Competition (Malaysia)
This may be represented by the regime in Malaysia. In the
electricity sector, the state-owned National Electricity Board
("NEB") was, until 1990, the primary utility responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution.7 Under the Electricity
Supply (Successor Company) Act of 1990, the NEB was converted into a corporate body called Tenaga Nasional Berhad
("TNB")." The Ministry of Finance holds thirty percent equity
shares in it and an investment wing of that same Ministry holds
the remainder of the shares. 2 In addition, the Minister of Finance holds a golden share "so that government influence will
remain dominant even if other shares are sold to private parwww.edf.fr/html/en/presentation/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2000).
167 The Electricity Directive 96/92, art. 13-15 1996 Oj (L 27) 20, 25. At
the time of writing, a proposal was before the French Parliament to restructure
the power business in France. Telephone Interview with Catherine Louis,
Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de lIndustrie (Sept. 28, 1999).
168 Although the French government has accepted the principle of unbundlingof accounts under the EC Electricity Directive, it would not accept unbundling of management. See CRoss, supra note 13, at 31. Cagniart, supra
note 127, at 217, argues that, because member states have wide latitude in implementing the Electricity Directive, the proposed French bill for power reform fulfills the minimum requirements.
169 See Cagniart,supra note 127.
170 See Electricity Act § 3 (Act 116) (rev. ed. 1973) (Malay.). The NEB had
powers to raise capital from the stock market. Id. § 17. See also Steven C. An-

derson, The Climatefor PrivateInvestment in Malaysia'sPower Sector, in EAST

ASIAN ELECTRICITY REFORM, supranote 125, at 115, 125.
171 Electricity Supply (Successor Company) Act 1990 (Act no. 448) (Malay.); Anderson, supra note 170, at 118.
172 Anderson, supra note 170, at 120 n.110.
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ties. " " It can be concluded that, contrary to what has been described as a privatized utility," TNB is effectively a state-owned
utility.
Through its shares, the government determines the investment and expansion policies of the utility."5 The Ministry of Finance monitors the investment activity of TNB.6 General supervision of the industry, however, is the responsibility of the
Ministry of Energy."n The Director General of Electricity Supply is below the Ministry of Energy, is appointed by the Minister
and has responsibility for, inter alia, the issue of licenses, the approval of power tariffs, and the determination of performance
standards.'78 Under the Electricity Supply Act of 1990, Independent Power Producers ('IPPs") are encouraged to operate in the
country, but their entry is regulated in terms of where they can
locate, as well as possible ownership structures. 9 The proposal
to form an IPP is submitted and appraised simultaneously by
TNB, or the relevant provincial utility, and the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister's Department.' If approved, the
sponsors of the IPP then have to negotiate a power sale agreement
with TNB before finally receiving a license to operate, usually for
twenty-one years.'
This organizational structure has built-in
checks and balances. Although the three-stage application process
173 Id.
174
175

Id.

See Anderson, supra note 170, at 117-27. The Minister of Finance may

give directions for the issue of securities and shares. Electricity Supply (Successor Company) Act 1990 5 4 (Act no. 448) (Malay.).
176 See Electricity Supply (Successor Company) Act 1990 § 4 (Act no. 448)
(Malay.).
177

See a

See Electricity Supply Act 1990 § 4 (Act no. 448) (Malay.). The Minister again has wide discretion in the appointment of members of the regulatory
board as well as the board of the utility. Electricity Sup ply (Successor Company) Act 1990 S 7-8 (Act no. 447) (Malay.). In the performance of its duties,
the regulatory board is to ensure an optimum supply of electricity at reasonable prices, to provide that all reasonable demand for electricity are satisfied,
and to promote and encourage generation of energy to facilitate Malaysias
economic development. Id. 5 4.
179 See Anderson, supra note 170, at 123.
The equity shares that nonMalaysians can hold in any IPP can not exceed twenty-five percent without
permission. See id. at 123 n.113.
180 Id. at 123.
181 Id.
178
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might take time, the simultaneous appraisal by the Ministry and
TNB or the provincial utility helps shorten the waiting period.
The involvement of the state-owned TNB, however, in a way
compromises the competitiveness of the entire regime. The limited competition posed by the 1PPs is weakened by the obligation
to sell the power they generate to TNB. In addition, TNB holds

up to a twenty percent equity interest in each of the IPPs." 2 This
equity interest, irrespective of its size, strengthens the position of
TNB in the industry. This position is made stronger by the fact
that it is the sole buyer of the power generated by the IPPs. 8'
Apart from TNB, which operates on the main Malaysian peninsula, there are two provincially owned utilities in the two island
provinces of Sabah and Sarawak. They are the Sabah Electricity
Board ("SEB") and the Sarawak Electricity Supply Company
("SESCO"), respectively.184 They perform all the power supply
functions, from generation to distribution, in the two provinces."' In addition, a number of IPPs have located their operations in the provinces."' 6 This is a deliberate policy by the central
government to encourage and direct IPP activity to the outlying
provinces and more remote areas of the country."' This might be
its way of promoting equity in power accessibility.
Using the determinants outlined for efficiency, the judgment
on the Malaysian restructured electricity industry is quite contested. The pricing of power by TNB is based on an eight percent
rate of return on the total assets.' 88 This is considered inefficient
because the IPPs return twice that on their assets."8 9 That notwithstanding, TNB no longer relies on the government for loan
guarantees; as of 1996, its long term debt, liabilities, and prospects
were rated "Al" by the international credit agency, Moody's International, and "A+" by Creditweek.' 9' This means that based
on profitability alone, TNB and the Malaysian electricity industry are efficient. This is reinforced by the remarkable achieve183

Id at 118-19.
Id.

184

Id. at 120.

185

Id.

112

186
187
18

189
190

d at 118.
Id.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id at 120.
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ments in the distribution of power and accessibility. Since the
1970s, TNB and the industry as a whole have been able to keep
up with demand that has been growing at the rate of thirteen percent per annum. 191
Accessibility is further enhanced by the government's control
over the determination of tariffs. TNB's tariffs to retail consumers are calculated by means of a price cap mechanism that has adjustments for fuel price escalation, inflation in other cost factors,
variability in demand, and improvements in productivity." It is,
therefore, based on a "cost plus" formula.'93 Whatever rates are
proposed by the utilities, the Director General of Electricity Supply has to approve them, often with adjustments. 9" Through the
Department of Energy and the Director General of Electricity
Supply, the government brings considerable political pressure to
keep the tariff rates low." s Apart from that, TNB, as the dominant utility in the industry, has taken the lead with the introduction of strict standards of performance.' 9" These include time
taken to connect or reconnect supplies, response times for service
complaints, minimum notice periods for planned outages, and
methods of collecting outstanding bills.'97
The environmental implications of the power industry in Malaysia involve a combination of imperatives owing to the varied
nature of the generating sources. One of the lessons learned from
the global oil crisis in the 1970s was the danger of relying on a
single source of power." The Malaysian government actively
pursued a four-fuel policy focused on utilizing diversified sources
to reduce dependence on oil for electricity generation.199 Due to
the costs of transportation and the severe environmental costs of
use of
is on
and hydropower.'
using
gas in coal,
placethe
of emphasis
coal and oil
hasgas
reduced
carbon dioxideThe
emissions

191 Govr OF MALAY., SEVENTH MALAYSIAN PLAN 1996-2000, 386 (1996).

Anderson, supra note 170, at 116.
Id at 124.
194 Id
1M 1d2 at 120.
19- d2 at 119.
197 Id at 119.
198 See SARAWAK FORESTRY DEP1r, MALAYSIA'S ENERGY POLICY, at
http://www.forest.gov.my/epolicy.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2000).
199 Id.
200 Id
192

193
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substantially. The government is also encouraging the exploita21
tion of the country's vast water resources for power purposes.
Currently, a 2400MW Bakun hydro-electric dam is under construction in the Sarawak province.0 2 When completed, it alone is
expected to contribute fifteen percent of the country's power
needs. 2 3 The construction of hydro-electric dams inevitably entails significant environmental consequences. The construction of
the Temengor dam in the Perak Province, for example, resulted
in the relocation of 127 families, and the construction of the
Batang Ai project entailed the resettlement of 3200 people from
450 longhouses.20 4 Some of the dams, as in the case of the Berisa
dam in the Perak Province, were built not only to generate
power, but also to regulate water flows.
The law on the environment is embodied in the Environmental Quality Act of 1974.205 It is the primary legislation regulating the environmental impact of power activity, particularly
generation. It specifies procedures for equipment operations and
maintenance, the operation of power plants including conditions
for discharges, and restrictions on atmospheric, soil, and water

pollution.20' It also sets out environmental impact assessment and
reporting procedures on the environmental impact of large hydro-electric facilities, combined cycle power stations, nuclear
power stations, and fossil-fired power stations of more than
10MW capacity." Additionally, the Department of Environment, which is responsible for overseeing and enforcing the environmental rules, issues periodic details in the form of Environmental Quality Regulations which spell out standards of
performance required of the power plants.2 8 Although provisions for market mechanisms of managing the environmental impact of power generation exist, the overwhelming thrust of the

201 Id
202

Id.

203 Id. This would add to the existing ten percent hydropower in the country. Id.
204

Id.

Environmental Quality Act, 1974, (Act No. 127) (Malay.).
Id.; Environmental Quality (Prescribed) Activities Sched. 12-13 (EIA
Order 1987) (Malay.); Anderson, supra note 170, at 117-18 n.107.
207 Anderson, supra note 170, at 117-18.
20

206

201

Id at 118.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss4/2

2000]

GOOD GOVERNANCE & ELECTRICITYMGMT

813

legal regime is for central state regulation and oversight of the environment.
The environmental regime is substantially the same in the
post energy reforms as before. Furthermore, apart from the introduction of IPPs that were not expected to command more

than thirty percent of the power market before the new millennium,20 9 the energy regime in Malaysia today is not radically different from the system that operated prior to the reforms in 1990.
The state is still heavily involved in the power industry in Malaysia. It owns the primary power utility that supplies more than
seventy percent of the total power demand in the country and
regulates the tariffs that can be charged by the utilities. 2" Furthermore, although private utilities are allowed, foreign ownership is restricted to twenty five percent and the state-owned TNB
maintains up to twenty percent equity interests in all private utilities.21' Although the IPPs are said to be performing profitably,

their profitability is also attributed to a number of other factors
including, most importantly, their prescription to sell the power
they generate to TNB on a "take or pay" basis.212 Although this
assures the IPPs a predictable return on investments, their
strength in the Malaysian power market does not equal that of
TNB. From a distance, it is not easy to distill all the outlined
tenets and practices of good governance or otherwise. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the regulatory process does not appear to
inhibit efficiency in terms of profit, nor does it frustrate equitable
access to power. Additionally, the stability of the system does
not appear to be in peril. If arm's length competition fosters efficiency, then that is lacking in the Malaysian regime. The promotion of such competition is the hallmark of the systems in England and Wales. In other countries, what might appear to be
liberalization is simply a transfer of the previously state-owned
and managed industry to private monopoly interests, often with
less certain consequences. The system in the Ivory Coast is a representation of this hypothesis.

209

ad at 119-21.

210

ITd

211

Id.
Id- at 118, 123. The contractual arrangement guarantees the IPPs a fif-

212

teen percent after-tax rate of return on assets. Id.
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5.3. PrivatizedMonopoly (Ivory Coast)
Under this model, the state has divested itself of the ownership of the utility, but the privatization process was such that
there is one dominant company that controls power from production to distribution. This is what happened in the Ivory
Coast. As with many African countries, a dictator ruled the
Ivory Coast for approximately thirty years, since its independence in 1960. Despite being a dictatorship, there was relative political stability and economic progress and was, therefore, described as an "oasis of economic prosperity.) 213 The economic
"boom" also coincided with expansion and effective performance
of the power utility. As in the case of many countries, the
Ivorian power industry started off with provisions for private
participation but was largely owned and operated by the state
Public Works Department."' In 1952, a corporate utility called
Energie Electrique de la Cote d'Ivoire ("EECI") was established to
take over the power activities of the Public Works Department.1
Eighty-seven percent of the shares in EECI were owned by the
colonial government and the remainder by the French Aid
Agency and the French power utility, EDF.216 EECI was in
charge of every aspect of the industry from generation to distribution.21 1 It invested generously in order to increase plant capacity and customer base.218 Serious efforts were also made at rural
electrification.219 Approximately sixty percent of the population
had access to electric power." Records reveal sugply to have
been very reliable with few, if any, power outages.
However,
213 COTE D' IVOIRE, A COUNTRY STUDY XV-4, 43-164 (Robert Handloff
ed., 1991).
214 Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 292.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217
218

Ijd
Id

"Electricity for all by the year 2000" was its slogan. Id. The EECI was
described as the best EPU in Sub-Saharan Africa outside of the Republic of
South Africa. Id.
21

Id at 292 n.6.
Siddhartha Mitter, Reluctant Sweethearts: Recent Foreign Investment in
African Infrastructureand Consequencesfor Growth and Distribution(Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, San Francisco, CA, 1996). Girod & Percebois, supra note 55, at 23, indicated that performance of utilities in Africa from their inception to the early 1980s was
220
21
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in return for this efficient service, tariff rates were very high.'
Moreover, the generous investments and the aggressive rural electrification programs of the 1970s took a toll on the performance
of the utility in the 1980s.m Internal corporate culture (such as
the emphasis on staff welfare, corruption, and in-fighting), uncollected bills, drought, adverse macroeconomic conditions, and
politicization of the management, conspired to serve the ends of
inefficiency. 4 Investments such as the construction of the Koussou hydro-electric plant were politically motivated, and in disregard of engineering and economic analyses. " Power outages became an acceptable phenomena, plants deteriorated, and income
plummeted."
The end of the thirty-year dictatorship of
Houphouet Boigny in 1990 saw the appointment of an JMF technocrat as Prime Minister who introduced widespread economic
reforms.' One of the first reform acts of the new Prime Minister was the sale of the state-owned EECI.? With alacrity and
without consultation, EECI was transferred to a foreign n9consortium by what might appear to be a management contract.
creditable. For example, installed capacity multiplied by an average of 2.7. IkL
'" Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
M Id.; see also Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 292-93 (stating that with a
declining economy, a drought, and aggressive spending, there was a decrease in
demand for electricity an a loss of revenue). Other causes included uncollected bills, foreign exchange debt, management errors, and bad corporate culture resulting in absenteeism. Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
22 The long-time Chief Executive Officer of the EECI had personal ties
with the then-President that extended to very favorable or lax oversight of the
utility. Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 309. The CEO and the EECI got
away with losses, inefficiency, and were insulated from reform. Id. This was
particularly worrisome as tariffs had to be approved by the Minister upon notification ofthe President. Id.
m Koussou is the hometown of the former dictator Boigny, and it is believed that was the critical factor in choosing the site for the dam. IaM at 299.
The Koussou and Taabo dams built on the same river system have never filled
up since construction. I They both have capacity factors of about ten percent. IR.
26 See generally Girod & Percebois, supra note 55, at 23 (describing conditions and causes that led to the power industry's "poor performance in technical, economic and financial matters").
"
Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
228 Id.
" Girod & Percebois, supra note 55, at 21; Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
The power reforms in the Ivory Coast were prepared in complete secrecy and
implemented in less than six months. Girod & Percebois, supra note 55, at 28
n.15.
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A consortium of two French companies, Bouygues, with
sixty-five percent ownership in the consortium, and EDF, with
thirty-five percent, formed a new utility, the CompagnieIvorienne
d'Electricite ("CIE"). 0 The French consortium took a controlling
share fifty-one percent of the new entity. 1 Twenty percent of
the remainder of the shares went to the government and the rest
was reserved for flotation on the Abidjan Stock Market. 2 CIE
obtained a concession contract of fifteen-year duration to generate, transmit, and distribute power in the Ivory Coast. 33 It also
assumed control over the staff, real estate, and resources of
EECI. The government retained ownership of the infrastructure but granted a twenty-year exclusive use to CIE." s The management of the public-owned infrastructure, responsibility for
new infrastructure, and oversight of the concession contract were
allocated to the remnant of EECI 6 All power activity- generation, transmission, distribution, billing, export, and import- became the monopoly of CIE. 7
Some "competition" is offered by Compagnie Ivore de Production d'electrici ("CIPREL"), a new IPP formed to generate power
from gas using the CCGT scheme." CIPREL was formed in the
wake of drought-induced load-shedding by CIE and curtailment
of exports by the Ghanaian utility. 9 For all practical purposes,
however, CIPREL was part of CIE. It is owned by the two
French owners of CIE (Bouygues and EDF) in exactly the same
proportions as they hold in the consortium that holds the con-

Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 293.
supra note 221, at 9; Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 293.
232 Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
23'Brew-Hammond, supranote 27, at 293-94.
" See Mitter, supra note 221, at 9.
235 itter, supra note 221, at 9.
236 Id. at 9-10.
237Id. at i0.
230

231Mitter,

23' Compagnie des Energies Nouvelles de la CMte d'Ivore was first formed as
an IPP in 1991 by the same interests and was replaced by CIPREL in 1995.
Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 294-95; see alio Girod & Percebois, supra

note 55, at 25 (attributing to CIPREL the first stages of an IPP plant in the
Ivory Coast). Unfortunately, the two learned authors accepted CIPREL at

face value as an IPP without a comment on its relationship with CIE and the
owners of CIE.
239 Mitter, supra note 221, at 12.
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trolling shares in CIE.' Moreover, CIPREL has contracted the
CEE staff to operate the new power station on its behalf.24 ' The
vertical integration and the monopolization of the electricity industry in the Ivory Coast were, therefore, complete.
The question then is, How has the private-owned monopoly
fared in terms of efficiency? By 1994, it had become clear that the
quality of power supply had improved substantially with less
power outages and reduced voltage fluctuations. For example,
average power outages had reduced from fifty hours to nineteen
hours within four years of privatization. 2 A more dynamic corporate culture was instilled into the utility and improved customer services in connections, repairs, and billing. 3 At the same
time, it also rigorously enforced power supply cuts to delinquent
customers and insisted on up-front payments for power purchases
by government agencies. 2 " In terms of profitability and quality
of service, the privatized utility has been efficient. On the other
hand, unlike the British privatization and competition, power
price to consumers in real terms increased.24 The rural electrification program has been abandoned and very few power connections have been effected since 1990.246 Research and development
was stopped, and all development activity contracted to French
consultants connected to the major shareholders in CIE. 24 CIE
disputed its responsibility for new infrastructure investments and
squabbled with EECI over maintenance of equipment with consequent delays and efficiency losses.248 This improper definition
of roles owes largely to the nature of the privatization process.
The whole process was not only hastened but also shrouded in secrecy.2 49 The program was not put up for tender as should be ex-

240

Id.

241

1d

242

Id.
Mitter, supra note 221, at 10.
Id
Id.
Id.

243
244
245

246

Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 304.
Mitter, supranote 221, at 10.
249 Id. See also Brew-Hammond, supra note 27, at 293 (describing a friction
between EECI and CE attributable to EEGT's dual role as representative of
Ivorian government and supervisor of CE).
247
248
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pected in accordance with the tenets of good governance. 5 The
appointment of key experts, especially in the area of finance, was
also not done in a transparent fashion.251 The financial reporting

systems for CIE are solely determined by the monopoly. 2 The
state pays CIE when power sales fall below a certain volume,
thereby removing incentive for increased sales." 3 The profitability or efficiency gains of the privatized utility, therefore, depend
not only on its monopoly power but also on government subsidies. Crucially, the regulatory system is weak and improperly
organized.' The Ministry of Energy, which is at the pinnacle of
the regulatory scheme, is poorly staffed, mainly by generally
trained civil servants. 5
The division of responsibility between the Ministry and what
was left of EECI was very unclear, leaving a large area of "no
man's land." 6 Five years after privatization, the important post
of Commissairedu Gouvernement, a regulator provided for in the
original contract, was not filled.25 To pre-empt the uncertainty
or unsatisfactory outcome of a privatized monopoly system, the
British government, unlike the Ivorian regime, opted not only for
a transfer of the vertically integrated state monopoly to private
owners, but also for a competitive regime.
5.4. Private Ownership and Competition (Englandand Wales)
The regime that exists in England and Wales can be said to be
an example of private ownership in the context of competition.
As already noted, prior to 1989, the electricity industry was stateowned and operated on a monopoly basis. The grand privatization revolution of the Thatcher government did not exclude the
electricity sector. In fact, for former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, privatization "was one of the central means of reversing
the corrosive and corrupting effects of socialism." 258 One of the
250 The award of the CCGT project to CIPREL was also not by tender.
See Mitter, supra note 221, at 12.

21

Id.
Mitter, supra note 221, at 10.
Id. at 11.

2
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Id.

251

252

See id.

256 Id.
257 Idj
251

MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 676 (1993).
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central factors behind the privatization of the electricity industry
was the desire to undermine the power of the mine workers unions." They were blamed for the fall of two previous governments and wielded enormous power through their control of coal
production, the primary source of electric power in the late
1980s. 210 It was believed that privatized utilities would seek less
expensive sources for power generation.261 The high cost of British coal at the time would render the use of coal not competitive
and, consequently, break the base of the union's power, which
rested on the monopoly status of the British coal. 2' The privatization agenda was, therefore, as much driven by ideological or
governance perspectives, as by the economic philosophy at the

time."' 3 As part of the general policy direction of the Thatcher

government, the industry then dominated by the CEGB was

overhauled. The legal regime for the industry was first encompassed by the Electricity Act of 1989 as amended by the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act of 19 92 26 4 However, responding
to the need for overarching legislation on energy utilities, the
Utilities Act was passed on July 28, 2000.265 The new regime has
two goals. First, to provide a fresh regulatory framework for
generation, transmission, and distribution of power in England

and Wales. Second, to transfer ownership of the industry from
the state to private entities initially nominated by the Secretary of
State for Energy.266

The most important development in the new dispensation is
the creation of a corporate body, the Office of Gas and Electricity
2" See id,; Thomas, The Privatizationof the Electricity Supply Industry, supra
note 25, at 52. A number of the politicians who championed the privatization
program stated their political agenda in their respective autobiographies. See,
e.g., NIGEL LAWSON, TiHE VIEW FROM No. 11 (1992) (expressing the Tory
view of privatization).
260 See Thomas, The Privatization of the Electricity Supply Industry, supra
note 25, at 52.
261 See Stephen Dow, Post-PrivatisationRegulation of UK Energy Industries,
3 INTERNET J. OF CENTER FOR ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MIN. L. & POLY 14
(1998), at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/ournal/html/article3-14.htm.
262
263

Id.
Id.

264 Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29 (Eng.); Competition and Service (Utilities)
Act, 1992, c. 43 (Eng.).

265

Utilities Act, 2000, c.27 (Eng.).

The utilities were first transformed from statutory bodies to crown
corporations listed on the stock market.
266
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Markets ("OFGEM").267 It should have at least three members,
with the Chair appointed by the Secretary of State and able to be
removed on grounds of incapacity or misconduct.268 The Authority is given the freedom to recruit supporting staff and to establish
systems appropriate for the attainment of the goals of the law.269
Under the Utilities Act, the Secretary and the Authority are empowered to protect the interests of consumers as far as generation,
supply, and distribution of power is concerned. At the same
time, they are obliged to promote effective competition between
entities engaged in the energy business.' Although the Secretary
and the regulatory Authority have considerable discretion in the
choice of methods for executing the objectives set out in the law,
they are under an obligation to take into account the following
factors: the need to satisfy all reasonable demand for power in
Britain, the financial capability of the utility interests, the interests of disabled or chronically sick persons, individuals of pensionable age, people with low incomes, and the needs of rural
dwellers.' This is a classic point where the efficiency and equity
ends of government energy policy join. While competition is believed to serve the ends of efficiency, in cases where competition
does not respond to the need for access or equity, the government
retains the leverage to direct policy in that direction.
Since 1989, the electricity industry in England and Wales has
been dominated by a duopoly: National Power and Powergen. 2
They inherited, in a seventy to thirty ratio, the generation assets
and activities of the former CEGB. 3 The transmission business
was initially granted to National Grid Company, which was
owned by the twelve Area Boards. 4 The Area Boards themselves
See Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, § 1 (Eng.). The Authority takes over the
functions of the erstwhile Office of Electricity Regulation ("OFFER"), established under section 1 of the Electricity Act, 1989. Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29,
1 (En.). Unlike the OFFER, however, and notwithstanding its corporate
status, the Authority is deemed to act on behalf of the Crown. Utilities Act,
267

2000, c. 27, § 1(2) (Eng.).
268 See Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, Sched. 1, § 1-4 (Eng.).

Id. Sched. 1, § 5.
See id. 9(1).
271 See i
13(3). The list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive of other descriptions of consumers.
269

270

273

See Dow, supra note 164, at 4.
Id.

274

Id.
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were transformed into Regional Companies, but theoretically deUnder a
prived of their previous distributive monopoly.'
graduated scheme that was completed in April 1998, any customer could place an order for power from any distributor or directly from a generator."'
It has been argued that reform of the U.K. power industry has
created fundamental changes in the character of the industry.m
This is because electricity was hitherto regarded as a public service
to be universally available." It is submitted that, although this
description of the power industry in the United Kingdom might
be fair, it is neither sufficiently comprehensive nor conclusive. In
the first place, as noted, it is not undisputed that the energy industry as exists today is fundamentally different from what it was in
the period before nationalization and the current reforms. More
importantly, some of the crucial goals of the nationalized system
remain the goals of the privatized regime as well. Goals such as
universality of access, consumer protection, environmental protection, and government's strategic influence are conspicuous in
the new regime. These goals entail a continuing significant role
for the state.
Universal or equitable distribution and access to power are
provided for in various forms under the new system. The special
interests of rural consumers, pensioners, and the disabled are to
be taken into account in the pricing and regulatory policies of the
Authority and in the commercial policies of the utilities." 9 Furthermore, the government, through the Secretary of State for Energy and the Authority, is to ensure that consumer interests, in
the form of regularity of supply and general safety, are protected.280 Consumer views are to be represented at the National
Consumers' Consultative Committee, established under the Utilities Act to replace the Electricity Consultative Councils of the na.s See Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29, pt. 2 (Eng.).
276 BOWDERY, supra note 77, at 50.
27 See Mike Parker, General Conclusions and Lessons, in THE BRITISH
ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 295.

See id
'9 Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, S 13(3) (Eng.). It would be politically risky
not to protect the very vulnerable members of society, hence the regulatory
system aims to discourage "cherry-picking" of more economically attractive
customers. See Mike Parker, Competition: the Continuing Issues, in THE
278

BRMSH ELECTRICITY EPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 227.
280

See Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, § 13 (Eng.).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. P. J. Intl Econ. L.

[21:4

tionalized system."' Detailed standards have been set for the
utilities vis-a-vis consumers and are enforceable by fines.2" 2 Consumers are regularly informed of their rights and the standards
expected of the utilities. In the main, therefore, the freedom to
express concerns about the power industry appears enhanced or,
at least, maintained.
Apart from equitable and consumer protection, the government generally maintains significant leverage over the power industry. In the first place, nuclear energy is excluded from the privatization drive and to date remains state-owned and operated.8 '
Secondly, the government retained golden share status in the two
largest privatized generators and the regional distribution companies. This safeguarded the structure adopted at the inception of
privatization for five years.284 Although it has, since 1995, relinquished the golden shares in the regional distribution companies,
the government still maintains the golden share position in the
two generators.2 ' One reason for this control by indirect means
is the old strategic desire to keep the industry safe from foreign
control. Beyond that, the industry requires continuing governmental regulation. Power generation and supply are generally
taken to be intrinsically competitive, but transmission and distribution are regarded as natural monopolies that need heavy doses
of regulation to avoid becoming exploitative. To this end, a tariff
mechanism that would assure sufficient profits for the utilities
and, at the same time, make power accessible and affordable to
Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29, S 53 (Eng.).
Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, % 18-24, 59-61 (Eng.). An interesting feature
is the effort by the government to link the remuneration of Directors of the
S 61.
utility companies to standards of service provided. See id.
283 Nuclear power constitutes approximately twenty-seven percent of the
total power supply in England and Wales as of 1994. A Callfor New British
PRESS INT'L, June 15, 1999, availableat LEXIS, News
Nuclear
UNITED
Library,Power,
Upi File.
Initial plans for privatizing nuclear power were rescinded
on safety, environmental, and economic grounds. See Thomas, Strategic Government and CorporateIssues, supra note 108, at 276-78. It is protected by an
obligation on suppliers to buy a certain percentage of power from "non-fossil
fuel" sources and, until Aug. 2000, supported by a 5overnment imposed fossil
fuel levy. Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29, S 32-33 (Eng). The fossil fuel levy was
repealed by the Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, S 65 (Eng.).
2181See
282

284 See Surrey, Unresolved Issues of Economic Regulation, supra note 21, at
250.
285 Thomas, Strategic Government and Corporate Issues, supra note 108, at
287. The government indicated that it would use its golden share power to restrain takeovers if such takeovers would undermine competition. See id.
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consumers has been worked out and reviewed periodically. The
formula is RPI-X, where RPI is the retail price index and X is the
efficiency factor that is supposed to be the incentive to the utilities to improve and reap the benefits of efficiency.286
Finally, the government retains significant control over the
environmental implications of utility services. Under the Utilities Act, the Secretary of State and the Industry Regulator are enjoined to protect the public from dangers arising from or associated with power generation, transmission, and distribution.
Furthermore, they are to take account of the effects of power activities on the physical environment in carrying out the functions
mandated by the Utilities Act.288 Beyond the provisions in the
Electricity Statute, a raft of general legislation relating to the environment applies to the electricity industry, most of it administered by the Department of Environment. 29 Regional and international agreements and directives impose other such
regulations.'
The period of privatization primarily coincided with significant reductions in emissions from sources connected with electricity. The reduction in sulphur dioxide emissions is the most conspicuous.291 Carbon dioxide emissions have also been significantly
reduced.292 This is mainly due to a change from coal-based power
generation to Combined Gas Cycle Turbine ("CGCT") sysSee Thomas, The Privatisationof Electricity Supply Industry, supra note
25, at 48. For more on this pricing formula, see Blanche Sas, The RPI-X Formula: Economic Regulation of the Electricity Industry (on file with the International Bar Association Section on Energy and Resource Law). John Surrey
analyzes the comparative merits of this method of pricing and the American
system based on rate of return or profitability and concludes that ultimately
they achieve the same results by being sensitive to voters' concerns. See Surrey,
UnresolvedIssues ofEconomic Regulation, supra note 21, at 245.
287 See Electricity Act, 1989, c. 29, § 3(3) (Eng.). As well as promoting environmentally sound power production and distribution, the government is
also encouraging the generation of electricity from renewable sources. See
Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27, % 62, 64 (Eng.).
286

Id.
See ROBERT DUXBURY & S.G.C. MORTON, BLACKSTONE'S STATUTES
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2000); STUART BELL, BALL AND BELL ON
ENVIRONMEN-TAL LAW: THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (2000).
29 See DUXBURY, supra note 289; BELL, supra note 289.
288

289

291

See Gordon MacKerron & Jim Watson, The Winners and Losers So Far,

in TE BRITISH ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 205-06.
292 Iad
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tems" 3 With the comparative profitability and efficiency of
CGCT systems, the growth of nuclear power is likely to be fossilized. This is also because government and non-governmental organizations consider private ownership and operation of nuclear
generating systems undesirable.294 Also, the possible investment
returns from such systems are insufficiently attractive to private
investors.9 As a result of continuing stringent international and
national environmental controls and the growing stature of
CGCT systems, the environmental impact of power generation in
the United Kingdom is likely to be minimal.
In all of these, the question to ask is, Has the privatization or
restructuring of the electricity industry in England and Wales improved the efficiency of the industry? It may be too early to
draw emphatic conclusions in light of the fact that the program
started only ten years ago and has been implemented in phases.
The final phase of complete freedom to all consumers in the
choice of their respective suppliers started with the passage of the
Utilities Act on July 28, 2000.96 Nevertheless, it is possible and
important to discern certain trends. The first four years of restructuring yielded phenomenal profits to the companies as indicated by the table below.
PROFITABILITY OF ELECTRICITY COMPANIES
297

IN ENGLAND AND WALES (CM)

National Power
Power Gen
REC's Supply

National Grid Co.
REC's Distribution
Nuclear Electric

1990/91
479
272
100

386
914
326

1992/93
580
425
173

1994/95
705
545
240

533
1501
664

611
1753
1218

293

This iswhat is described as the "dash for gas." See id. at 205-07.

294

See Gordon MacKerron, Nuclear Power Under Review, in THE BRITISH

ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENT, supra note 9, at 138 passim.
295 See id
296 Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27 (Eng.). I am grateful to Professor McEIdowney for drawing my attention to this development. Fortunately, the Utilities Act has retained the general tenor and orientation of the 1989 Electricity
Act.
291 MacKerron & Watson, supra note 291, at 199.
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The figures above seem to show that privatization was beneficial in terms of increasing profits. However, profit increases were
not necessarily prompted by privatization. 2 s The previously
state-owned utilities were profitable on their own. For example,
in the last year of full state ownership in 1987/88, the electricity
industry made a net contribution of £1.47 billion to the treasury.
This trend continued up until the dawn of privatization.299 In addition, the huge profits made by the privatized electricity companies were founded or facilitated by governmental support." ° The
government support came in the form of high tariffs or price controls based on the need to make the privatized industry attractive
to shareholders.3 'O Also, falling coal and gas prices facilitated
high-profits."0 2 Privatization simpliciter, therefore, did not guarantee profitability. Government policy was crucial.
In terms of accessibility and standards of service, the evidence
is also inconclusive. This is because standards of performance by
the previously state-owned electricity utility were already very
high. The concern at the inception of privatization was how, at
the very least, to maintain that high level. One area in which privatization made a definite difference is the disconnection of services to defaulting customers. At the instance of the erstwhile
OFFER, and its successor OFGEM, the privatized power companies are to find ingenious ways of recovering outstanding debts,
other than by disconnecting customers. 3 Another segment of
298 The privatized utilities did embark on drastic cost-cutting measures by
almost doing away with research and development and by reducing labor from
47,000 in 1989 to 27,000 in 1994. David Newberry, The Restructuringof UK
Energy Industries: What Have We Learned?, in THE UK ENERGY EXPERIENCE:
A MODEL OR A WARNING? 9 (Gordon Mackerron & Peter Pearson eds., 1996).
299 This was made up of tax, interest repayment, and profit. See MacKerron and Watson, supra note 291, at 206. In 1991, the privatized companies paid
a total of £693 million in taxes. This increased to £1014 million in 1995. Id. at
207.

100 Id. at 207.
301 I at 212.
302 See id.

OFGEM, as the office for the regulation of the gas and electricity industries, protects the interests of consumers as part of its mission. OFFICE OF
303

GAS AND ELEC. METS., SAFETY AND SUPPLY INTERRUPTIONS FACT SHEET, at

http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/customers/safety.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2000).
Electricity and gas suppliers must assist clients who have difficulty paying their
bills. Id, While OFFER was still the controlling agency, only 674 customers,
out of twenty-four million, were disconnected in the years 1995 and 1996.
U.K. ELEC. INDUSTRY, KEY FACTS, at http://www.electricity.org.uk/ukinds
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the industry that has suffered under privatization is research and
development. In a bid to enhance profits by reducing costs, the
privatized companies have drastically cut down on research and
development activities .s" This notwithstanding, the British energy sector does not deviate from the criteria established for efficiency in this work.
6. REGIONAL DIMENSIONS

An important trend in the electricity business is its growing
international connections."' 5 The industry has hitherto been considered a national security concern that had to be under an overarching national policy umbrella.1 6 The electricity industry has
also been constrained by national borders with regard to where
power is generated and to whom it is supplied. To the extent that
any significant international relations existed, they related mainly
to the financing and the equipment or technology-supply aspects
of the industry. An increasing emphasis on the international dimensions of the business is one of the new characteristics of the
electricity industry. There are two important aspects to this.
The first is the marketing of the power generated in one country
to other countries and the second is the impact of regional or international regulatory initiatives on domestic systems.
The French utility, EDF, is the leading exporter of electricity
in Europe. 7 Its export balance of power exchanges with foreign
countries in 1997 was 65.3 billion kWh."'8 This represents FRF
15.3 billion, a contribution of 8.7% to France's foreign trade balance.3" 9 Furthermore, the company has invested more than FRF
4.2 billion in Europe, Latin America, and Asia.310 These invest/keyfacts.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2000).
314

305

See MacKerron & Watson, supra note 291, at 210-11.

For examples of these trends, see Edward Rugoyi, The Interconnectionof

the Southern African Power Pool, 12 OIL & GAS L. TAX. REV. 434 (1998); see
also SWEDISH TRADE COUNCIL, ELECTRICITY ExCHANGES IN SCANDINAVIA

(1996) (describing existing electricity exchanges among Sweden, Norway, and
Finland).
306 See JEAN KIRK LAUX & MAUREEN APPEL MOLOT, STATE CAPITALISM:
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN CANADA 20 (1988).
307

EDF ANNOUNCED FINANCIAL RESULTS, supra note 160.

308 j1d

309 Id.

Id EDF has a presence in India, China, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Id.
310
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ments have made it possible for EDF, together with its partners
and subsidiaries, to participate in the operation of distribution
companies with more than 8.5 million customers world-wide."'
The company also has interests in generating activities outside of
France totalling approximately 11,500 MW.31 EDF has a binary
transmission network with the United Kingdom and, due to excess capacity, it serves as the first point of call whenever shortages
occur or are anticipated in the United Kingdom.1 The United
Kingdom itself does not export power on any significant scale.314
The United Kingdom's role in the international power market
has historically been limited to participation in generation and, to
a lesser extent, the transmission and distribution of electricity in
individual countries.315
As in the case of EDF, the Ivorian power utility has also engaged the international power market.316 It also has a binary
transmission network with Ghana and, since 1994, it has been exporting power to Ghana; prior to that point, it had been importing power from Ghana. 31' To the extent that CIE contributes to
the profitability and the international network of EDF, although
not directly investing in generation and related activities internationally, it has a stake in EDF's investments world-wide. In the
West African region, four countries- Nigeria, Togo, Benin, and
Ghana- have concluded an agreement to construct a gas pipeline
that would transport gas from Nigeria to the other three countries for the purpose of power generation.3 ' This may lay the

Id.
Id.
313 BOwDERY, supra note 77, at 47.
314 In 1998, for example, the United Kingdom imported 12.6 TWh power
and exported 0.2 TWh. France, on the other hand, imported 4.0 TWh and exported 62.0 TWh. INTL ENERGY AGENCY, ELECTICITY NFORMATION 1998,
23 (1999).
315 Id.
311

312

See Frankie Asare-Donkah, The Dilemma of CRA, ECG, DAiLY
GRAPHIC (Ghana), Jan. 10, 1998 (on file with author).
316

317 See id

318 See Heads of Agreement for the Supply and Transmission of Natural
Gas, Sept. 5, 1995, Benin-Ghana-Togo-Nig.
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foundation for a comprehensive regional grid network. Similar
trends are observable in Latin America,3"9 and elsewhere.32
The European Community ("EC") regime is the most advanced regional regulatory system for power.32 ' The EC regime is
encapsulated in the Electricity Directive of December 1996 ("the
Directive")." The Directive requires member states of the European Community to open up their domestic markets to competition and to allow access to their markets and infrastructure to
member countries' utilities.3" In addition, they are required to
disintegrate the management, or specifically, the accounts of the
various segments of their respective power industries." Individual countries are also required, if by implication, to establish
transparent and effective regulatory mechanisms that assure the
implementation of the principles and goals of the Directive.325
Another important aspect of the EC power regime is the place it
accords to protection of the environmental aspects of the industry. The Directive calls for effective regulation and management
of the environmental consequences of power activities."' However, it ties the protection of the environment to the resources
available to the relevant utility. This is in line with the general
thinking in the Energy Charter Treaty,3" but may derogate from
the tenets of the "polluter pays" principle. Beyond environmental
protection, the injunctions imposed by the Electricity Directive,
319 Argentina and Paraguay have participated in a bi-national hydroelectric
project, Salto Grande. MuLTLATERAL DEV. BANK ENERGY PROJECT,
ENERGY AND THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA
CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN FACTS AND DIsCOURSE (1997), at http://
fp.chasque.net:8081/energy/english/Lareport/ch9.htm.
Paraguay and Brazil
Have also pooled resources for the ItaipAi hydroelectric project over the Parana
river, the largest hydroelectric dam ever. JOEL SAMPAIO & LUIZ A.N. SILVA,
ITAIPO DAM, at http://ce.eng.usf.edu/pharos/wonders/Modern/itaipu.html
(last modified Jan. 16, 2000).
320 See, e.g., SWEDISH TRADE COUNCIL, supra note 305 (describing collaborative trends among Sweden, Norway, and Finland).
321 See generally Botchway, supra note 53 (discussing the current energy regime in Europe).
31 Council Directive 96/92 of 19 December 1996 Concerning Common
Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity, arts. 4-5, 1996 O.J. (L 27) 20.
323 See id.art. 19.
324 This is what is described as "unbundling of accounts." Id. arts. 13-15.
31sSee id. art. 13.
326 See id. art. 5.
3' Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 IL.M. 360 (1995).
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together with the competition rules and other policies of the EC,
should have a profound impact on the power regimes of member
countries. This is especially true of countries like France, which
have integrated monopoly systems.328
7. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion confirms the hypothesis stated at the
outset of this Article. Power utilities did not generally start life as
state-owned enterprises. In some countries, private power business was thriving before nationalization of the industry. A number of different reasons for nationalization have been discussed.
In the main, state ownership was critical for the liberation of the
liquidity stranglehold in which the utilities in some countries
were locked. Second, in many countries, it was politically or
ideologically conditioned. National security was thought to be
better protected by state control of the vital power industry. At
the same time, the Second World War unleashed the left-leaning
philosophies and policies that spurred the nationalization drive.329
Another important conclusion to be drawn from this work is that
the state has been pivotal in the power industry. State intervention took the form of regulation when the industry was in private
hands. The primary objective of such regulation was to make
private power practice more equitable. The concern of governments has been the need to enhance both physical and price accessibility to power. In other cases, it facilitated the profitability of

318

There are a myriad of works on EC Competition law and policy. One

of the most recent is MARC VAN DER WOUDE & CHRISTOPHER JONES, EC

COMPETITION LAW HANDBOOK: 1999/2000 EDITION (1999). A helpful review of works on the subject is provided by Jo Shaw, Review of Books on Competition Law and Policy, 5 EUR. L.J. 103 (1999). The study of the implications
of EC competition law on the energy industry is quite embryonic, but there is
an emerging academic constituency on it. See, e.g., Patrick Blanchard, French
Electricity Sector: ECI Decision on Monopoliesfor the Import and Export of Electricity, 17 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 265 (1999); James Dinnage, Joint
Activities Among Gas Producers: The Competition Man Commeth, J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 249 (1998); Leigh Hancher, Delimitation of Energy Jurisdiction: The EU and its Member States: From Organisationalto Regulatory Conflicts, 16J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 42 (1998). For the purposes of this
work, Blanchard's Article is the most interesting as it indicates the substantial
role the state could play in the energy sector under the banner of public service
See Blanchard, supra,at 328.
329 See FROST, supra note 13, at 39-62.
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the utilities. These imperatives also drove the nationalization of
the industry.
The same imperatives that drove prior industry nationalization are driving power industry reforms today. All four models
identified in this Article have as their goals the efficient operation
of the industry and equity both in price and accessibility of
power.
In all, the state's participation appears inevitable in the areas
of general regulation, financial support, equity, and environmental protection. State intervention varies depending upon the

model employed in the relevant country and the general circumstances of the country concerned. State monopoly and state monopoly-with-competition, in general, receive more financial support and less regulatory network than private ownership with
competition. Private monopoly, where it occurs in a country
with weak governance structures, as in the Ivory Coast, may yield
good returns for the utility, but such returns rarely trickle down
to address equity issues.
In the case of environmental protection, none of the models
show significantly unique qualities. As indicated, there is hardly
any environmental regime designed specifically for the electricity
industry in any of the countries studied. Environmental improvements have come about because of changes in technology
and costs, rather than as a result of the adoption of any particular
model. Specifically, the lower costs of establishing and operating
gas-fired plants have resulted in shifts away from coal-based
power and substantial reductions in sulphur dioxide and carbon
dioxide emissions.33 With respect to hydro-electricity, OECD
has reached its respective optimum, as suitable and environmentally acceptable sites are increasingly difficult to locate.33 At the
same time, the huge cost outlays and environmental risks involved in investing in nuclear power mean that nuclear power
330 In 1992, sixty million tons of coal were used for power generation.
This figure fell to about thirty million two years later. See Newberry, supra
note 298, at 19.
331 Hydroelectric production in the OECD fell by 2.6% from the 1997
level. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supranote 314, at 14. It appears
that hydropower would continue to hold attraction to developing countries
because of the relative abundance of water resources and less complicated technological and safety requirements. Gas-based power can also be expected to
grow in developing countries for the same reasons that it may expand in rich

countries.
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would continue to remain state-owned or heavily state-controlled.
That in itself points to an important revelation in this work:
where power is derived from nuclear sources, the conspicuous
presence of the state is inevitable. 332 As the cases of France and
expands with the
the United Kingdom show, state involvement
33
size of the nuclear power industry.
One issue that cannot be overemphasized is the need for a
functioning and efficient regulatory system. All four models of
reform reveal the crucial role that state regulation plays in the attainment of the economic and social goals of the industry and the
tragic consequences that a weak or politicized regulatory system
can have for the industry and country. Until August 2000, the
British regime allocated a central role to an independent and
largely personalized regulator.334 The Malaysian system works
through a network of coordinated government departments and
TNB. The French system involves a close relationship between
the regulatory agencies and the utility. The Ivorian and the Kenyan regimes reveal a very weak, almost non-existent, and highly
politicized regulatory practice.
As this work has shown, irrespective of the model of reform
adopted, the state will continue to play a significant role in the
power industry for reasons of efficiency, equity, and the very
unique nature of the industry. Taken together, the current British and French regimes largely conform to the tests for efficiency
proposed in this Article. These include profitability, equity or
access, and a regular, but hastened, process. If the two opposing
models- state-owned monopoly and competitive private ownership- satisfy the criteria for efficiency, there is little reason to be
passionate about either model beyond polemics. It has to be said,
however, that the two systems are located in well-established
democratic and bureaucratic contexts. As the British model indi332 In 1997, Nuclear power constituted eighty-two percent of total power
generated in France. See EDF ANNOUNCED FINANCIAL RESULTS, supra note
160. In England and Wales, nuclear power was withdrawn from the privatization program and remains publicly owned. See Newberry, supra note 298, at 8.
In Scotland, the utilities were privatized as a vertically integrated duopoly but
the nuclear power remains in public ownership. See id
"I See id. at 8-9. For a historical discussion of the political, environmental
and technological issues, see CAMILLERI, supranote 2 passim.
3" Thomas, The Privatizationof the Electricity Supply Industry, supra note
25, at 49. Under the Utilities Act, a three-member regulatory authority is established to regulate the industry. See Utilities Act, 2000, c. 27 (Eng.).
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cates, there seems to be significant flexibility and space for regulatory and production choice in systems that are liberalized. These
two reasons may account for the varying fortunes of the two intermediary models- the privatized monopoly in Ivory Coast and
the quasi-competition in Malaysia. Although the Malaysian system responds positively to the three tests for efficiency, it has not
attained optimum levels. In the end, the conclusion that social
and government goals of efficiency and equity in power supply
can be met only in an environment of effective democratic governance and bureaucratic efficiency is inescapable.
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